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“T

he bare fact that a sentence is within the maximum which
the legislature has prescribed does not prevent it from
violating the constitutional provision forbidding the imposition
1
of cruel and unusual punishments.”
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides
that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
2
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
Although initially construed narrowly to prohibit only barbarous
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. The author
thanks Joanna Cerino for her diligent research assistance in preparing this Article.
The author also expresses his thanks to Professor Rick Greenstein and Linda S.
Gallini, Ph.D., for their comments on previous drafts.
1 Barber v. Gladden, 309 P.2d 192, 196 (Or. 1957), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 948
(1959).
2 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII. Initially, the Eighth Amendment did not apply to
the states. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947)
(plurality). In Robinson v. California, however, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 370 U.S.
660, 667 (1962).
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forms of punishment such as torture, the Eighth Amendment
now prohibits sentences that are either contrary to the evolving
4
or
standards of decency in our maturing society,
disproportionate to the commission of a defendant’s underlying
5
offense.
Although, at first blush, the Amendment’s
development suggests that it serves to limit a state’s power to
punish, a cursory review of pertinent Supreme Court decisions
reveals that the Eighth Amendment poses a low constitutional
6
hurdle.
Thus, the task of determining what comprises cruel and
unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment
7
remains formidable. The Supreme Court’s vacillation on key
punishment issues, like the constitutionality of imposing the
3

Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1879).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
5 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23–24 (2003).
6 See, e.g., id. at 30–31 (upholding a twenty-five-year-to-life sentence imposed
pursuant to a California recidivist statute for felony grand theft (i.e., stealing three
golf clubs worth approximately $1200)); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003)
(upholding two consecutive twenty-five-year-to-life sentences under a California
recidivist statute for two counts of petty theft); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
995–96 (1991) (holding that a sentence of life without parole for possession of 672
grams of cocaine did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464
(holding that it was not “cruel and unusual” to force petitioner to undergo
execution of second death warrant after administration of first failed as a result of a
mechanical accident); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 631 (1912) (affirming
life sentence for a horse thief pursuant to a West Virginia recidivist statute and
noting that petitioner could not “maintain[] that cruel and unusual punishment has
been inflicted”).
7 See infra note 100; see also, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002)
(holding that cuffing an inmate to a hitching post for longer than necessary to
restore order violates the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
320–21 (2002) (holding that it is “cruel and unusual” to execute the mentally
retarded); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409–10 (1986) (finding it
unconstitutional to execute an insane defendant); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is disproportional to the crime of rape);
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (holding that a ninety-day sentence was excessive for
narcotics addiction); Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (holding that denationalization as a
punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 381–82 (1910) (holding that punishment of fifteen years jailed in irons at
hard and painful labor for the crime of falsifying records was excessive); In re
Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 171 (1890) (“[T]he solitary confinement to which the prisoner
was subjected . . . was an additional punishment of the most important and painful
character, and is, therefore forbidden by . . . the Constitution of the United
States.”); see also Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815, 822 (Alaska 1968) (reversing
thirty-six-year sentence imposed upon defendant convicted of passing checks with
insufficient funds).
4
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death penalty on both mentally retarded and juvenile offenders,
has further confused the meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s
8
No critique of the Eighth
already imprecise language.
Amendment’s application to juveniles would be complete
without recognizing that states are perhaps equally to blame for
the confusion. It took nearly three decades for a majority of
states to determine the permissibility of sentencing a juvenile
9
killer to prison for life without parole.
The constitutional boundaries of juvenile life sentences
nevertheless remain unclear.
Despite litigants’ logical
expectations that courts would assign a lesser sentence to
nonkilling juveniles, courts still impose identical sentences on
juvenile offenders who had drastically different roles in the
crimes for which they were convicted. Consider the juvenile
defendant who aided and abetted in killing his father’s shop
employee by (1) helping the shooter enter the shop under false
pretenses, (2) robbing the shop after the shooter killed the
victim, and (3) manipulating the crime scene to make it appear
10
that someone had forcibly entered the shop.
In contrast,
consider the fourteen-year-old defendant who had a history of
sexual and physical abuse and was forced by her boyfriend to
11
lure a man into their house to rob him. After doing so, she left
8 Compare Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (“A majority of States
have rejected the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18,
and we now hold this is required by the Eighth Amendment.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at
321 (“[T]he Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to
take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405)),
with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“We discern neither a
historical nor a modern societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital
punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age.”); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (“[W]e cannot conclude today that the Eighth
Amendment precludes the execution of any mentally retarded person of
[petitioner’s] ability convicted of a capital offense simply by virtue of his or her
mental retardation alone.”).
9 See infra Part II.C and accompanying discussion.
10 Dang v. State, 154 S.W.3d 616, 617–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (subsequent
history omitted).
11 ACLU OF MICH., SECOND CHANCES: JUVENILES SERVING LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE IN MICHIGAN PRISONS 13 (2004), http://www.aclumich.org/pubs/
The defendant, Barbara
juvenilelifers.pdf [hereinafter SECOND CHANCES].
Hernandez, and her abusive boyfriend, the principal, received the same life without
parole sentence. Id.; cf. Toomey v. Clark, 876 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1989)
(pregnant sixteen-year-old received life in prison for helping her boyfriend lure a
robbery victim, who the boyfriend unexpectedly shot). According to Hernandez’s
sister, the boyfriend “locked [Hernandez] up in a bedroom with no clothes, he
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the room and her boyfriend stabbed the man to death.
Notwithstanding their varying participation in the victim’s death,
both juveniles received sentences of life without parole.
No court has addressed the federal constitutional significance,
if any, of sentencing juvenile murder accomplices who play a
minimal role in a murder to life in prison without parole. No
precedent clarifies whether it is cruel and unusual to impose life
in prison on juvenile offenders after a first-degree murder
conviction imposed pursuant to either the felony-murder
doctrine or accomplice/coconspirator theories of liability, despite
their minimal involvement in the victim’s death. To investigate
these unanswered questions, Part I of this Article explores the
imposition of life without parole sentences on juvenile nonkillers
convicted of murder via either the felony-murder doctrine or
13
accomplice liability. Part I illustrates the problematic nature of
imposing these sentences on less-culpable juvenile nonkillers
convicted of first-degree murder by offering examples of
defendants who received identical sentences yet played different
roles in the victims’ deaths. Part II outlines the evolution of the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s
“cruel and unusual” clause before examining the Court’s
application of the clause to juveniles. Part II concludes by
evaluating the application of the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence to juvenile punishment in the lower
courts.
Finally, Part III asserts that automatically sentencing juvenile
nonkillers to life in prison without parole precludes lower courts
from exercising judicial discretion in order to individualize
juveniles’ sentences. Part III then argues that the Supreme
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence provides no remedy
because it is ill-equipped to handle a juvenile nonkiller’s Eighth
threw an ashtray at her, [and] he burned her with cigarettes.” Karen Bouffard,
Group Aims to Set Abuse Victims Free; Clemency Petitions Ready for Inmates Who
Murdered, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 24, 2005, at 1B.
12 Id.; see Karen Bouffard & Jennifer Brooks, Engler Won’t Free 13 Battered
Women; Abuse Wasn’t Allowed as Defense at Their Trials, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 18,
2002, at 1A (“Hernandez left home to escape an abusive mother and stepfather.
Her father was in prison for rape. Her stepfather routinely molested her.”).
13 At least two commentators more broadly examined whether the felony-murder
rule should apply to juveniles at all. Steven A. Drizin & Allison McGowen Keegan,
Abolishing the Use of the Felony-Murder Rule When the Defendant Is a Teenager, 28
NOVA L. REV. 507 (2004).

GALLINI.FMT

2008]

12/8/2008 11:01:36 AM

Equal Sentences for Unequal Participation

33

Amendment challenge to a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole following a murder conviction given pursuant to
felony murder or accomplice liability. Taken together, Part III
contends, these deficiencies allow for further erosion of the
ideals underlying juvenile punishment.
I
THE PROBLEM OF IMPOSING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
SENTENCES ON JUVENILE NONKILLERS
As determinate sentencing systems grow, so do examples of
sentences imposed without individualized consideration of the
circumstances surrounding a defendant’s participation in the
crime.
Murder prosecutions of juvenile nonkillers via
accomplice liability or the felony-murder doctrine illustrate two
examples of the sometimes inequitable results produced by
harsh determinate sentences. Accordingly, Section A examines
the unique problem of the felony-murder doctrine’s application
both to juvenile principals and accomplices. To help focus the
issue outside the context of felony murder, Section B thereafter
offers case studies at opposite ends of the participation
14
spectrum.

14 For an interesting compilation and discussion of juveniles serving life without
parole sentences in the state of Michigan, see SECOND CHANCES, supra note 11.

GALLINI.FMT

34

12/8/2008 11:01:36 AM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87, 29

A. The Unique Problem of Felony Murder
1. Juvenile Principals Convicted of Felony Murder

15

The typical formulation of the felony-murder rule imposes
first-degree murder liability upon a defendant who causes a
death during the commission or attempted perpetration of an
16
enumerated felony. As a general rule, the Eighth Amendment
permits sentencing of juvenile principals convicted of felony
15 The first, and perhaps most obvious, question is how juveniles end up in adult
court. Various methods exist for transferring a juvenile into adult criminal court,
including: (1) waiver; (2) direct file/statutory exclusion; and (3) once-an-adultalways-an-adult statutes. Enrico Pagnanelli, Note, Children as Adults: The Transfer
of Juveniles to Adult Courts and the Potential Impact of Roper v. Simmons, 44 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 175, 181 (2007); Scott C. Zarzycki, Note, A Current Look at Ohio’s
Juvenile Justice System on the 100th Anniversary of the Juvenile Court, 47 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 627, 646 (1999). Regardless of the method for transferring a juvenile into
adult criminal court, a juvenile’s commission of felony murder has historically–and
not surprisingly–always formed the basis for prosecution in adult court. E.g., WIS.
STAT. § 938.18(1)(a) (2007) (stating that a petition for waiver may be filed if the
juvenile committed, inter alia, felony murder on or after the juvenile’s fourteenth
birthday); see also In re Michael B., 650 A.2d 1251, 1256–59 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994)
(affirming juvenile court’s decision to transfer respondent to adult court following
the juvenile court’s finding of probable cause that respondent committed felony
murder by shooting to death a mother, her son, and their family dog during a
burglary at their home); State v. Gribble, 655 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)
(“[A] juvenile is triable as an adult for the offense of ‘murder’ when the offense is
‘felony-murder’ regardless of whether he is triable as an adult for the underlying
felony.”); Snodgrass v. State, 406 N.E.2d 641, 642 (Ind. 1980) (noting that felony
murder is an offense that, when committed by a child, would serve to characterize
the child as an adult). But cf. People v. Smith, 547 N.Y.S.2d 150, 153 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1989) (holding that juvenile defendant may be convicted of felony murder only
if the underlying felony constituted a felony for which the juvenile could have been
held criminally responsible as an adult).
16 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.06, 556–71 (4th
ed. 2006). The origins of the felony-murder rule are both “questionable,” People v.
Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1980), and “obscure,” Rudolph J. Gerber, The
Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 763, 764
(1999). The early felony-murder rule arose from scholarly writing, rather than the
common law, and was rarely applied to cases. See Guyora Binder, The Origins of
the American Felony-Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 64 (2004) (observing that
the first true felony-murder rule did not appear until the nineteenth century in
America). In fact, in early England, almost all felonies potentially were punishable
by death. Id. Thus, it made little difference to a felony murderer whether he was
executed for murder or the underlying felony. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 310–11.
Contra Leonard Birdsong, Felony Murder: A Historical Perspective by Which to
Understand Today’s Modern Felony Murder Rule Statutes, 32 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1, 13 (2006) (asserting that execution rates in England varied greatly and
likely were not as widespread as commonly believed).
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17

murder to life in prison without parole. For example, one court
imposed a life sentence without possibility of parole for a
sixteen-year-old defendant who was convicted of first-degree
felony murder after he shot an expectant mother following a car
18
jacking; another court imposed a sentence of life without
parole plus sixty-two years on juvenile defendant who, at age
sixteen, committed kidnapping, aggravated robbery, aggravated
19
sexual battery, and felony murder.
20
An instructive exception to this rule is People v. Dillon. The
defendant in Dillon, a seventeen-year-old high school student,
was convicted following a jury trial of first-degree felony murder
after he and several others attempted to steal marijuana from a
marijuana farm, during which defendant panicked and fatally
21
shot a man who was guarding the farm.
Defendant appealed, contending, inter alia, that his sentence
of life imprisonment violated the “cruel or unusual
22
punishment[]” clause of the California Constitution.
At the
outset of its analysis, the California Supreme Court observed
that the felony-murder rule “condemns alike consequences that
are highly probable, conceivably possible, or wholly
unforeseeable,” and, correspondingly, “the Legislature has
provided only one punishment scheme for all homicides
occurring during the commission of or attempt to commit an
17 E.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 855 A.2d 885, 892 (Pa. 2004) (upholding
juvenile’s life sentence for felony murder); Tate v. State, 864 So. 2d 44, 54 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reversing and remanding on other grounds but “reject[ing] the
argument that a life sentence without the possibility of parole is cruel or unusual
punishment on a twelve-year-old child and that it violates [a]rticle I, [s]ection 17 of
the Florida Constitution and the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution”).
18 People v. Launsburry, 551 N.W.2d 460, 463–64 (Mich. App. 1996).
19 State v. Taylor, No. 02C01-9501-CR-00029, 1996 WL 580997, at *24 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Oct. 10, 1996).
20 668 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983).
21 Specifically, defendant and seven other boys entered the victim’s farm with the
intent to steal his marijuana. Id. at 701. After climbing the hill toward the victim’s
farm, they split into pairs and spread out around a field. Id. Upon seeing one of the
victim’s brothers tending to the plants, the boys elected to wait, prompting at least
two to give up altogether. Id. As one of the boys attempted to return to the farm,
he accidentally twice discharged his weapon. Id. Amidst the chaos, the victim had
circled behind defendant and was approaching him with a shotgun. Id. As the
victim drew near, defendant discharged his weapon, hitting the victim nine times;
the victim died from his wounds several days later. Id.
22 Id. at 700.
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offense listed [by statute] regardless of the defendant’s
23
individual culpability with respect to that homicide.” The court
continued, “in some first degree felony-murder cases this
Procrustean penalty may violate the prohibition of the California
24
Constitution against cruel or unusual punishments.”
With its disdain for the felony-murder rule as background, the
court proceeded to evaluate defendant’s challenge by using a
25
In doing so, it emphasized the
proportionality analysis.
importance of considering the nature of the offense (i.e., by
evaluating “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the offense”) and the nature of the offender (i.e.,
by assessing defendant’s “age, prior criminality, personal
26
characteristics, and state of mind”).
With those factors in
mind, the court observed, “a punishment which is not
disproportionate in the abstract is nevertheless constitutionally
impermissible if it is disproportionate to the defendant’s
27
individual culpability.”
Turning to the facts of the case, the Dillon court gave
credence to defendant’s trial testimony, which presented a
“plausible picture . . . of the evolution of defendant’s state of
mind during these events–from youthful bravado, to
28
uneasiness, to fear for his life, to panic.”
Additionally, in
evaluating defendant’s specific circumstances, the court
highlighted trial testimony from a clinical psychologist who
stated that defendant was both intellectually and emotionally
29
immature.
This, alongside the jury’s apparent reluctance to

23

Id. at 719.
Id.
25 To evaluate a proportionality challenge in California, a court considers the
following “techniques” outlined in In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1972): (1) the
nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of
danger both present to society, noting in the presence of aggravating circumstances
or whether the offense was nonviolent, id. at 931; (2) a comparison of “the
challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed in the same jurisdiction for
different offenses which, by the same test, must be deemed more serious,” id.; and
(3) “a comparison of the challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed for
the same offense in other jurisdictions having an identical or similar constitutional
provision,” id. at 932.
26 Dillon, 668 P.2d at 720–21.
27 Id. at 721.
28 Id. at 722–23.
29 Id. at 723.
24
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30

convict defendant and the limited punishment given to
31
defendant’s cohorts, led the court to conclude that “the
punishment of this defendant by a sentence of life imprisonment
as a first degree murderer violates article I, section 17, of the
32
[California] Constitution.”
Although based on a state
constitution, the Dillon decision suggests that the felony-murder
doctrine may provide a basis for juveniles convicted of felony
33
murder to argue for lesser sentences.
2. Punishing Juvenile Nonkillers Convicted of Felony Murder
No opinion provides explicit guidance on whether the Eighth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution permits sentencing a
juvenile nonkiller convicted of felony murder to life in prison
without parole. Several juvenile felony-murder cases illustrate
the problem of imposing that sentence on juvenile nonkillers,
regardless of their actual role in the victim’s death. For example,
34
compare the facts in the following two cases: In People v. Petty,
the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed a life without parole
sentence imposed on fifteen-year-old Gregory Petty, who
encouraged his twelve-year-old companion to commit armed
35
robbery. During the course of the robbery, the twelve-year-old
shot and killed the victim because the defendant threatened to
36
kill him if he did not shoot the victim.
37
In contrast, the defendant in Kaiser v. Hannigan was merely
present at the time of the victim’s death. Specifically, seventeen30 During its deliberations, the jury specifically asked if it could bring in a verdict
of second-degree murder or manslaughter even if it found that defendant’s killing
occurred during an attempted robbery. Id. at 724.
31 Id. at 727.
32 Id.; cf. State v. Broadhead, 814 P.2d 401, 409 (Idaho 1991) (“As we read the
lead opinion and those of the concurring justices, the result was dictated more by
the California court’s consideration of the felony murder rule than it was by the
defendant’s age.”), overruled on other grounds, State v. Brown, 825 P.2d 482 (Idaho
1992).
33 See Drizin & Keegan, supra note 13, at 531 (arguing, at a minimum, that the
felony-murder rule was never intended to punish children under the age of fourteen
because children that age are incapable of forming a criminal intent).
34 665 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 2003).
35 Id. at 445.
36 Id.
Defendant’s twelve-year-old companion pled guilty to second-degree
murder and received a “delayed sentence.” Id. at 445 n.1.
37 No. CIV.97-3239-DES, 1999 WL 1289470 (D. Kan. Dec. 16, 1999), aff’d, Kaiser
v. Nelson, 229 F.3d 1163, 2000 WL 1125608 (10th Cir. 2000).
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year-old defendant Joshua Kaiser and triggerman Jason
Schaeffer absconded from a juvenile drug-treatment facility and
38
conspired to steal a car. Armed with an unloaded sawed-off
shotgun, Shaeffer, along with defendant, spotted the victim
39
starting his car.
Although defendant suggested they simply
steal the car, Schaeffer insisted on kidnapping the victim by
40
forcing him into the trunk. The trio subsequently drove out to
the country, where Schaeffer stopped the car, made the victim
stand facing away from him, and then shot him in the back of the
41
head.
Notwithstanding his comparatively lesser role in the
42
victim’s death, Kaiser–like Petty–received a life sentence.
Again, however, neither of these representative opinions
provide any Eighth Amendment analysis and therefore serve
only to provide illustrative examples of juveniles who receive
identical sentences notwithstanding their disparate roles in the
victim’s death.
Even the few opinions that provide some remote guidance on
the level of participation necessary to sustain a juvenile
nonkiller’s felony-murder conviction and life without parole
sentence make apparent the need for clearer constitutional
43
boundaries. In People v. Cavitt, seventeen-year-old James
Freddie Cavitt and two other juveniles, seventeen-year-old
Mianta McKnight and sixteen-year-old Robert Williams,
planned to burglarize McKnight’s house where she lived with
44
her stepmother.
To commence the robbery, McKnight let
Cavitt and Williams into the house where the boys threw a sheet
over McKnight’s stepmother, and secured her with rope, duct
45
tape, and plastic cuffs. While Cavitt and Williams secured the
stepmother, they repeatedly punched her in the back to quiet
38
39

Id. at *1.
Id. Although the shotgun was not loaded, Schaeffer had shells in his pocket.

Id.
40

Id.
Id.
42 Kaiser, 2000 WL 1125608 (noting that Kaiser received life for aggravated
kidnapping, life for felony murder, fifteen years to life for aggravated robbery, and
one to five years for unlawful use of a weapon); State v. Kaiser, 918 P.2d 629, 632
(Kan. 1996) (same). Nothing in any of the Kaiser opinions suggests that Kaiser will
ever be eligible for parole.
43 91 P.3d 222 (Cal. 2004).
44 Id. at 226.
45 Id.
41
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46

her. The pair then ransacked the house, tied up McKnight next
to her stepmother, and left under the impression that the
47
McKnight’s stepmother
stepmother was still breathing.
48
subsequently died from asphyxiation.
Cavitt and Williams were convicted following a jury trial of
felony murder notwithstanding their contention that McKnight
49
killed her stepmother out of hatred after the pair left the house.
In affirming defendants’ convictions, the California Supreme
Court held that “the felony-murder rule does not apply to
nonkillers where the act resulting in death is completely
unrelated to the underlying felony other than occurring at the
50
same time and place.” Thus, “there must be a logical nexus–
i.e., more than mere coincidence of time and place–between the
felony and the act resulting in death before the felony-murder
51
rule may be applied to a nonkiller.” The court clarified that
regardless of whether the nonkiller was present at the time of
the victim’s death, a temporal relationship between the
underlying felony and the homicide exists so long as the felony
52
and the killing are part of one continuous transaction.
Turning to the facts of the case, the court held that a logical
53
nexus existed between the burglary and the murder. Without
considering Cavitt’s age, the court reasoned that “the crimes
involved the same victim, occurred at the same time and place,
46 Id. (noting that McKnight’s stepmother “sustained extensive bruising to her
face, shoulders, arms, legs, ankles and wrists, consistent with blunt force trauma”).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 225. McKnight claimed that her stepmother was not breathing and that
she then called her father who called the police. Id. at 226. Although medics were
able to get a heartbeat, McKnight’s stepmother suffered brain damage and later
died from asphyxiation caused in part by her injuries. Id.
49 Id. at 227. Cavitt was also convicted of personally inflicting great bodily injury
during the commission of a murder. Id. Although he received a twenty-five-yearto-life sentence–as opposed to life without parole–the analysis underlying the
court’s decision further focuses the inquiry on how much a juvenile nonkiller must
participate in the underlying felony preceding the killing in order to sustain a
conviction for felony murder. See id. (noting Cavitt’s sentence); see also Julie N.
Lynem, Man Convicted of Murder in ’95 Brisbane Slaying, S.F. CHRON., June 19,
1999, at A16 (reporting that the sentencing court spared Cavitt from a sentence of
life in prison without parole because of Cavitt’s age at the time of the killing and his
expression of remorse).
50 People v. Cavitt, 91 P.3d 222, 227 (Cal. 2004).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 227, 234.
53 Id. at 231.
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and were each facilitated by binding and gagging [the
54
stepmother].”
At first blush, the California Supreme Court’s pronouncement
that “a nonkiller cannot be liable under the felony-murder rule
where the killing has no relation to the felony other than mere
55
coincidence of time and place” seems to address the need for
each co-felon to participate in some meaningful way in the
killing in order to sustain a conviction and corresponding life
without parole sentence. Yet, the amorphous “coincidence of
time and place” language associated with this “logical nexus”
test provides more questions than answers.
Although
subsequent opinions suggest that the participation threshold is
56
low, litigants and commentators are nonetheless left to wonder
what specific role, if any, a juvenile’s age serves in the analysis.
B. Juvenile Murder Accomplices
The imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile
nonkiller convicted of murder as an accomplice or coconspirator
raises similar constitutional problems to those presented by
57
juvenile felony-murder cases. For example, the defendants in
Swinford v. State and People v. Miller were merely present when
the victims were killed, whereas the defendants in Salinas v. State
and People v. Jensen contributed extensively to the victims’
deaths.
Yet, notwithstanding their varying levels of
participation, the applicable law mandated that all defendants
receive a life without parole sentence.
1. Minimal Participation: Darla Jo Swinford
“On December 28, 1990, twenty-two days after her fourteenth
birthday, Darla Jo Swinford was present when her eighteen
[-]year-old boyfriend shot and killed a young man whom Darla

54

Id. at 236.
Id. at 231.
56 See, e.g., People v. Dominguez, 140 P.3d 866, 878 (Cal. 2006) (“Liability for
felony-murder . . . extends to those who knowingly and purposefully participate in
the underlying felony even if they take no part in the actual killing.”).
57 See infra note 296 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s
conclusion in a 1996 decision that the evolving standards of decency did not
preclude a life without parole sentence imposed upon a fifteen-year-old murder
accomplice).
55
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58

had dated.”
Swinford began dating the triggerman, George
59
Johnson, Jr., at the age of twelve. After Johnson returned from
a trip to Florida with a friend and soon-to-be accomplice, he
learned that Swinford–now fourteen–had initiated a
relationship with the victim, Jamie Medlin, a Horn Lake,
60
Mississippi, teenager.
Out of jealousy, Johnson sought to take action against
61
Medlin. To do so, Johnson “told Swinford that he wanted to
meet and talk with Jamie Medlin. Swinford informed Jamie
Medlin of Johnson’s wishes and then arranged for them to meet
62
behind a Malone & Hyde factory in DeSoto County.” During
the meeting, Swinford “suspected trouble” when she saw the gun
but, rather than seeking help, she remained in Medlin’s car while
“Johnson blew Jamie Medlin’s face away with a close-range blast
63
from [a] borrowed shotgun.”
Two days after Swinford fled
with Johnson and his accomplice, the trio was arrested in
64
Following a jury trial, Swinford was convicted of
Florida.
aiding and abetting Johnson in the commission of Medlin’s
65
murder, for which she received a life sentence.
Although appellate counsel for Swinford failed to challenge
66
the duration of her sentence, counsel did contend that the trial
court should have announced its reasons on the record for
declining to impose an alternative criminal sanction on Swinford

58 Swinford v. State, 653 So. 2d 912, 918 (Miss. 1995) (Banks, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). In response to the dissent’s characterization of
Swinford’s involvement, the majority, in holding that sufficient evidence existed to
support a guilty verdict, notes: (1) that “Swinford testified that she suspected
trouble when she saw Johnson arrive with a gun”; (2) “[s]he neither tried to stop the
discussion or leave for help”; and (3) “she subsequently traveled with Johnson and
Branum to Florida with packed bags.” Id. at 915 (majority opinion).
59 Id. at 913.
60 Id. at 913–14.
61 Id. at 914.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 914–15. Johnson and his accomplice, without Swinford’s help, dragged
the body into the nearby woods. Id. at 914.
64 Id.
65 Id. There is no indication in the Swinford opinion that defendant will have the
opportunity to seek parole.
66 Counsel for Swinford is an eminent domain attorney. See Attorneys–Smith,
Phillips, Mitchell, Scott & Nowak, http://www.smithphillips.com/attorneys.php
?attorney=5 (last visited Nov. 24, 2008).
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67

as a youth offender.
Despite the clear absence of on-therecord reasons from the trial court, the Mississippi Supreme
Court merely “admonish[ed]” the trial court for its failure and
noted that this case did not present the type of special
circumstances necessary to invoke the requested alternative
68
sentence. Instead, the court observed without further analysis
that Swinford “was a typical Horn Lake teenager” who did not
69
merit an alternative sentence.
2. Minimal Participation: Leon Miller
On November 19, 1997, two victims were shot and killed
70
Four people were
outside a Chicago apartment complex.
charged for their involvement in the crime, including fifteen71
year-old Leon Miller who served as a “lookout.” For his role
72
in the victims’ deaths, a jury convicted Miller of murder. Yet,
67 Swinford, 653 So. 2d at 917. The Mississippi Youth Court Act enabled the trial
judge to “‘in his discretion, commit such child to the county jail for any term not in
excess of one (1) year’,” suspend sentence, commit the child to the custody of the
Department of Corrections, or impose a fine as though the child were an adult. Id.
at 917 (quoting MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-159(3) (Supp. 1990)).
68 Id. at 918.
69 Id. (citing White v. State, 374 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 1979)). Other than the
outcome of the White decision, no aspect of that opinion supports the Swinford
court’s transparent reasoning. See infra note 253 and accompanying text (noting
that the single paragraph of constitutional analysis in the White opinion is
“unaccompanied by legal citation or consideration of defendant’s age”).
Moreover, this comment as the basis for a court’s reasoning is particularly
egregious given that the court declines to elaborate on who is, in fact, a “typical”
Horn Lake teenager. As of the 2000 census, the 7.2-square-mile city of Horn Lake
housed a population of 14,099 residents, less than ten percent of whom earned a
bachelor’s degree, CityData.com, http://www.city-data.com/city/Horn-LakeMississippi.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2008), as compared to the Mississippi average
of more than eighteen percent and the nationwide average of roughly twenty-seven
percent, U.S. Census Bureau, http://factfinder.census.gov (follow “Data Sets”
hyperlink; then follow “Ranking Tables” hyperlink under “2005 American
Community Survey; then follow “R1402 Percent of People Who Have Completed a
Bachelor’s Degree” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 24, 2008). These facts by
themselves suggest that there is nothing “typical” about growing up as a Horn Lake
teenager. More importantly, even a half-hearted effort to individualize Swinford’s
sentence demands a more detailed inquiry into, at a minimum, the role of her age,
her background, and psychological condition. In this case, however, the trial court
sentenced Swinford without even the benefit of a presentence report. Swinford, 653
So. 2d at 918 (Banks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70 People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 302 (Ill. 2002).
71 Id. at 302–03.
72 Id. at 303.
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rather than imposing the statutorily required life sentence on
Miller, the trial court sentenced him to serve fifty years and held
that the Illinois “multiple-murder” statute violated both the
73
Illinois and federal constitutions.
Following the State’s appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed and, in doing so, engaged in a proportionality analysis
to determine whether “the punishment for the offense is cruel,
degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to
74
shock the moral sense of the community.” In concluding “that
the penalty mandated by the multiple-murder sentencing statute
as applied to this defendant is particularly harsh and
unconstitutionally disproportionate,” the court reasoned that:
(1) the “multiple-murder” statute prevents a sentencing court
from considering the offender’s age or participation level in the
crime, (2) the automatic transfer statute required the sentencing
court to treat Miller as an adult, and (3) the accountability
75
statute equated Miller with the actual shooter. According to
the court, “[w]hen these three statutes converge, a court never
considers the actual facts of the crime, including the defendant’s
age at the time of the crime or his or her individual level of
76
culpability.”
3. Substantial Participation: Erik Brendan Jensen
Nathan Ybanez met Erik Brendan Jensen when a mutual
friend, Brett Baker, introduced them at a pizzeria in Highlands
77
Ranch, Colorado. Unbeknownst to Jensen when he and Baker
73 Id. at 303–04. When sentencing Miller, the trial court observed, “I have a 15year-old child who was passively acting as a look-out for other people, never picked
up a gun, never had much more than–perhaps less than a minute–to contemplate
what this entire incident is about, and he is in the same situation as a serial killer for
sentencing purposes.” Id. at 303.
74 Id. at 307.
75 Id. at 308. Notably, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
holding on the basis of the state constitution. Id. at 309–10.
76 Id. at 308. In passing, the court also highlighted the distinction between adult
and juvenile offenders, noting in particular that, “as a society we have recognized
that young defendants have greater rehabilitative potential.” Id. at 309. Yet, the
court simultaneously cautioned that “[i]t is certainly possible to contemplate a
situation where a juvenile offender actively participated in the planning of a crime
resulting in the death of two or more individuals, such that a sentence of natural life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole is appropriate.” Id.
77 Both Erik Jensen and Nathan Ybanez were profiled as part of PBS Frontline’s
recent special entitled “When Kids Get Life.” Frontline: When Kids Get Life (PBS
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invited Ybanez to join their rock band, Ybanez was enduring
significant problems at home, including both physical and sexual
78
79
Those problems culminated on June 5, 1998, when
abuse.
Ybanez’s mother told him she was sending him to a Christian
80
military school.
That evening, then-seventeen-year-old Jensen, high on
marijuana, drove then-sixteen-year-old Ybanez to his apartment,
where Ybanez went inside and told Jensen to check on him if did
81
not return in twenty minutes. Approximately thirty minutes
later, Jensen went up to the apartment, where Ybanez’s mother
82
let him in. As Jensen entered the apartment, however, Ybanez
83
hit his mother in the head with fireplace tongs.
Jensen
admitted at trial that he provided Ybanez with plastic wrap to
suffocate Ybanez’s mother and that he “dropped” the fireplace
84
tongs on her.
More pointedly, according to trial testimony
from Baker, Jensen “told him that he had hit the victim three
times in the head with the tongs, and that the last time, the tool
television broadcast May 8, 2007), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/whenkidsgetlife [hereinafter Frontline, Ybanez & Jensen]. The totality of
the program’s transcript, along with interviews, original video, and analysis remains
available on the PBS Web site. Id. Given that the opinion issued by the Colorado
Court of Appeals provides limited background facts (it declines even to note that
Jensen was a juvenile at the time of the crime), this Article makes periodic
reference to the PBS interviews to provide a more complete factual context.
78 Frontline, Ybanez & Jensen, supra note 77. The signs of Ybanez’s troubled
home life prompted Jensen’s and Baker’s parents to intervene by contacting a social
worker, yet no social worker was ever assigned to investigate. Id.
79 The PBS Web site erroneously lists 1996 as the year of the crime, but a review
of pertinent news articles clarifies that the crime took place on this date in 1998.
E.g., Jason Blevins, Teen Blames Fear for Role in Slaying of Friend’s Mom,
DENVER POST, Aug. 6, 1999, at B2 (noting date of crime was June 5, 1998); Jason
Blevins, Trial Under Way for Teen in Slaying of Friend’s Mom, DENVER POST, Aug.
5, 1999, at B2 (same).
80 Frontline, Ybanez & Jensen, supra note 77. Baker later testified at trial that
Ybanez had previously told him he was going to kill his mother that night because
she had threatened to send him to school and that Jensen was “scared shitless.”
People v. Jensen, 55 P.3d 135, 138 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
81 Jensen, 55 P.3d at 137; Jason Blevins, Teen Killer Gets Life Term: Jensen
Helped Slay Pal’s Mom, DENVER POST, Aug. 12, 1999, at B2 (noting Jensen was
seventeen at the time of the killing); Jason Blevins, Teen Blames Fear for Role in
Slaying of Friend’s Mom, DENVER POST, Aug. 6, 1999, at B2 (noting Ybanez was
sixteen at the time of the crime).
82 Jensen, 55 P.3d at 137.
83 Id. at 137–38.
84 Id. at 138.

GALLINI.FMT

2008]

12/8/2008 11:01:36 AM

Equal Sentences for Unequal Participation

45

‘got stuck in her head; and when he pulled it out, that’s how the
85
blood got on the ceiling.’” Ybanez completed the killing by
86
The pair
using the fireplace tongs to strangle his mother.
subsequently called Baker, who helped them clean up the
87
scene. A jury convicted Jensen of first-degree murder, along
with conspiracy and accessory charges. Jensen received a
sentence of life in prison without parole on the murder charge
and concurrent sentences of twenty-four years and six years on
88
the conspiracy and accessory counts.
4. Substantial Participation: Jorge Alfredo Salinas
On the evening of July 28, 2001, seventeen-year-old Jorge
Alfredo Salinas was at home smoking marijuana with his
brother, Lorenzo, and acquaintance, Oscar Villa Sevilla, when
89
Sevilla expressed his desire to steal a car. Salinas retrieved a
shotgun, gave it to Sevilla, and the pair walked to a nearby
intersection. Sevilla entered the road and pointed the shotgun at
Geronimo Morales, driver of the first car that stopped at the
90
intersection. Sevilla and Salinas forced their way into the car;
Sevilla got into the driver’s seat and pushed Geronimo to the

85 Id.
This is the testimony that earned Jensen a spot under the heading
“Substantial Participation.” Without it, Jensen’s case could easily represent an
example of “Minimal Participation.” Interestingly, on that note, the prosecutor
initially charged Jensen and Baker as accessories in the murder, but both were
released on bail. Frontline, Ybanez & Jensen, supra note 77. Baker, however,
entered into a plea bargain and agreed to testify against Jensen. Id. As part of that
testimony, Baker told prosecutors that Jensen knew in advance about the murder
and had told Baker he hit Ybanez’s mother with the tongs three times. Id. In
exchange for his testimony, Baker received total immunity from the murder
charges, a shortened preexisting sentence he was serving in a juvenile facility, and
an agreement by prosecutors not to revoke his probation stemming from other
charges. Id. At trial, Jensen denied hitting Ybanez’s mother with the fireplace
tongs. Jason Blevins, In Testimony, Jensen Denies Swinging Tongs at Ybanez,
DENVER POST, Aug. 10, 1999, at B-06.
86 Jensen, 55 P.3d at 138.
87 Id.
88 Id. Jensen initially explored plea negotiations for second-degree murder, but
they fell through in the wake of the Columbine school shootings. Frontline, Ybanez
& Jensen, supra note 77; Luke Turf, Headed for Trouble Erik Wanted to Help His
Friend Get Out of the House: He Succeeded–They’re Both in Prison for Life,
DENVER WESTWORD, July 7, 2005, available at http://www.westword.com/2005-0707/news/headed-for-trouble/.
89 Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
90 Id. at 737–38.
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passenger seat while Salinas got into the backseat where twenty91
one-month-old Leslie Ann Morales sat in her car seat. Initially,
Sevilla demanded money from Geronimo but, when Geronimo
92
stated that he did not have any, Sevilla began beating him.
Sevilla then stopped the car, dragged Geronimo into an orchard
and shot him, after which he stole Geronimo’s wallet, a gold
93
ring, and a silver necklace.
Sevilla subsequently returned to the car, and the pair–along
94
with the baby–returned to Salinas’s house to pick up Lorenzo.
Upon seeing the baby in the car, Lorenzo suggested that they
leave her where someone would find her. Sevilla, however,
insisted on driving a mile and a half outside of town where he
and Salinas took the baby out of the car, still in her car seat, and
95
left her in tall grass. Border patrol officers later recovered her
96
lifeless body on July 29, 2001. In the interim period, before
their capture, the three cohorts (1) attempted to sell Geronimo’s
car, (2) sold the shotgun, and (3) fled to Mexico where they
abandoned Geronimo’s car after engaging in a car chase with
97
Mexican authorities.
Following his capture on August 3, 2001, Salinas was indicted
for, and convicted of, three counts of capital murder and was
98
sentenced to death. In response to his appeal, the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the convictions but reduced
Salinas’s sentence to life in prison without parole because he was
99
seventeen years old at the time of the crime.

91

Id. at 738.
Id.
93 Id. Authorities recovered Geronimo’s body on August 1, 2001. Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 738.
96 Id.
Leslie Ann died from dehydration, exposure to the elements, and
heatstroke. Id. Testimony from the patrol officer reflected that the child was in an
area where she was not likely to be found. Id.
97 Id.
98 Specifically, the three-count indictment charged Salinas with capital murder in
the course of a robbery, committing multiple murders in the same criminal
transaction, and murder of a child under the age of six. Id. at 741 n.3; see Jim
Pinkerton, Teen Arrested in Killing of Man, Baby; Police Seek 2 Other Suspects,
HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 4, 2001, at A38 (noting date of Salinas’s capture).
99 Salinas, 163 S.W.3d at 743. Salinas has not fared well in prison; on August 18,
2004, he stabbed a prison guard thirteen times with a metal rod from a typewriter.
Steve McVicker, Proposal for TVs on Death Row Tuned Out; Backers Say State Is
92
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The foregoing examples illustrate the problematic nature of
applying the extraordinarily harsh penalty of life without parole
on juvenile nonkillers who had disparate levels of participation
in the victim’s death. Indeed, the lack of individualized
consideration of each juvenile’s participation raises questions
about how current Supreme Court Eighth Amendment
standards would treat the sentence of life without parole. It is to
these questions that this Article now turns.
II
THE IMPACT OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT ON FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS
This Part of the Article broadly considers the evolution of the
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and then
focuses on the Court’s historical treatment of juvenile offenders
in the capital context. Finally, this Part considers how lower
courts have applied the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence to juvenile punishment.
A. The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has never precisely defined the phrase
100
“cruel and unusual.”
The phrase does, however, hold a penal
connotation, and its inclusion in the Constitution derives from
101
the English Bill of Rights of 1688. Early interpretations of the
clause dating back to 1879 understood the terms “cruel and
Ignoring a Tool to Control the Condemned, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 5, 2004, at A1.
Amazingly, the guard was not seriously injured. Id.
100 Compare Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (“What constitutes
a cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly decided.”); Howard v.
Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 136 (1903) (“But it is unnecessary to attempt to lay down any
rule for determining exactly what is necessary to render a punishment cruel and
unusual . . . .”), with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“The prohibition
against ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’ like other expansive language in the
Constitution, must be interpreted according to its text, by considering history,
tradition, and precedent, and with due regard for its purpose and function in the
constitutional design.”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 821 (1988) (“The
authors of the Eighth Amendment drafted a categorical prohibition against the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, but they made no attempt to define the
contours of that category.”).
101 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–100 (1958) (noting the principle represented
by the “cruel and unusual” phrase is traceable back to the Magna Carta); Louisiana
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (“Prohibition against the
wanton infliction of pain has come into our law from the Bill of Rights of 1688.”).
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unusual” to prohibit only punishments of torture, such as “where
the prisoner was drawn or dragged to the place of execution [for
treason],” “where he was embowelled alive, beheaded, and
quartered [for high treason],” or where a female was burned
102
alive for treason.
Accordingly, the Court rejected early
assertions that a punishment violated the Eighth Amendment
103
solely because of its excessive duration.
The Court’s approach expanded in 1910, when it recognized in
Weems v. United States that “it is a precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
104
With that in mind, the Court invalidated a fifteenoffense.”

102 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1879). Interestingly, even these early
interpretations recognized that “the sentence of death” does not inflict cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 137; see In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)
(observing that “the punishment of death is not cruel” because the Eighth
Amendment “implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life”).
103 O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339–41 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting)
(discussing cases). But cf. McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (1899)
(“But it is possible that imprisonment in the state prison for a long term of years
might be so disproportionate to the offence as to constitute a cruel and unusual
punishment.”). In O’Neil, the Court affirmed defendant’s conviction for “selling
intoxicating liquor without authority” and corresponding sentence to “pay a fine of
$6140, and the costs of prosecution, taxed at $497.96, and stand committed until the
sentence should be complied with”; and if the “fine and costs, and costs of
commitment, ascertained to be 76 cents, the whole aggregating $6638.72, should not
be paid before March 20, 1883, he should be confined at hard labor, in the house of
correction at Rutland, for the term of 19,914 days.” 144 U.S. at 330. Although the
Court reasoned that the case presented no federal question, id. at 335–36, the
dissent asserted that the language of the Eighth Amendment prohibited not only
sentences involving torture, but also “all punishments which by their excessive
length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged,” id. at 339–40
(Field, J., dissenting).
104 Weems, 217 U.S. at 367 (emphasis added). As later courts would observe,
however, “[t]he principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime is
deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence.” Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983). The concept of proportionality dates back to the
Magna Carta which, in 1215, dedicated three chapters to emphasizing that fines as a
punishment may not be excessive. Id. The principle made its way through the
common law, beginning with the First Statute of Westminster in 1275, and
continuing when prison sentences became common. Id. at 285 (citation omitted).
The English Bill of Rights reiterated the principle of proportionality and, when the
Framers based the language of the Eighth Amendment on the English Bill of
Rights, they too incorporated this concept. Id. at 285–86.

Although the Framers may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go
beyond the scope of its English counterpart, their use of the language of
the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof that they intended to provide
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year prison sentence, including hard labor, imposed upon a
105
defendant who falsified a public record. Armed with this more
discretionary approach to Eighth Amendment issues, the Court
in Trop v. Dulles applied its proportionality analysis nearly a
half-century later to strike down a statute that authorized a
military court to revoke a soldier’s citizenship and leave him
106
stateless as a penalty for wartime desertion.
Although the
Court recognized death, prison, and fines as examples of
107
constitutionally acceptable sentences, a plurality of the Court
held that denationalization “is a form of punishment more
primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the
108
political existence that was centuries in the development.”
The Court reasoned that the Eighth Amendment’s scope “is not
static,” and the text “must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
109
society.”
Notwithstanding the seemingly firm ground upon which
proportionality was initially based, a series of post-Trop
decisions left the viability of proportionality challenges
110
uncertain.
For example, a proportionality analysis seemed
indispensable in Coker v. Georgia where the Court held that a
death sentence is disproportionate to the crime of raping an
adult woman, and it therefore violates the Eighth
111
Amendment.
The Court reasoned, after taking guidance
“from the objective evidence of the country’s present judgment
at least the same protection–including the right to be free from excessive
punishments.
Id. at 286 (emphasis added).
105 Weems, 217 U.S. at 357–58, 381–82.
106 356 U.S. at 101.
107 Id. at 100.
108 Id. at 101.
109 Id. at 100–01; see Weems, 217 U.S. at 378 (“The [‘Cruel and Unusual’] clause
of the Constitution in the opinion of the learned commentators may be therefore
progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” (citing Ex parte Wilson, 114
U.S. 417, 427 (1885))).
110 Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983) (“And our prior cases have
recognized explicitly that prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis.”),
with Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J.) (“Solem was simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no
proportionality guarantee.”).
111 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
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concerning the acceptability of death as a penalty for rape of an
112
adult woman,” that only Georgia authorized such a sentence
(two other jurisdictions provided for capital punishment when
113
the victim is a child).
At first, the Court’s decision in Coker seemingly represented
the only application of proportionality review to non-capital
114
cases. In Rummel v. Estelle, petitioner was convicted–at
different times–of credit card fraud, forgery, and theft (each
115
felonies) involving the total sum of $229.11.
After his third
conviction, petitioner was sentenced to life in prison (with the
possibility of parole) pursuant to a Texas recidivist statute; in
response, petitioner asserted that his punishment was
disproportionate to his crimes and therefore constituted cruel
116
and unusual punishment. The lower courts denied petitioner’s
writ of habeas corpus, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that petitioner’s life sentence did not violate the Eighth
117
Amendment.
The Court reasoned that “[o]utside the context
of capital punishment, successful challenges to the
proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly
118
rare,” and that for crimes “punishable by significant terms of
112 Id. at 593. Notably, the petitioner in Coker had previously raped and stabbed
a young woman to death on December 5, 1971. Id. at 605 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Roughly eight months later, petitioner kidnapped a second young woman, whom he
raped twice, stripped, beat, and left in a wooded area. Id. For these crimes, he was
sentenced to three life terms, two twenty-year terms, and one eight-year term of
imprisonment. Id. While serving those sentences, petitioner escaped in September
1974, after which he immediately raped another woman, abducted her, and
threatened to kill her. Id. It was this crime for which the Georgia court sentenced
petitioner to death. Id. As the dissent noted, the plurality’s holding “prevents the
State [of Georgia] from imposing any effective punishment upon Coker for his
latest rape.” Id.
113 Id. at 595–96 (plurality opinion).
114 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
115 Id. at 264–66.
116 Id. at 267.
117 Id. at 285.
118 Id. at 272. The Court emphasized the limited utility of challenges to the
proportionality of noncapital sentences. See id. (“Because a sentence of death
differs in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long, our
decisions applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments to capital cases
are of limited assistance in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment meted
out to [petitioner].”). But see, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978)
(“Confinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to
scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.”); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
667 (1977) (noting that the Eighth Amendment broadly “proscribes punishment
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imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of the sentence
119
actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.”
120
Yet, in Solem v. Helm, the Court reaffirmed the utility of
121
the proportionality analysis in noncapital cases.
In Solem, the
Court considered the constitutionality of a life without parole
sentence imposed on petitioner after his seventh nonviolent
122
felony (uttering a “no account” check for $100).
In affirming
the Eighth Circuit’s holding that petitioner’s sentence violated
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime” (citing Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910))); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 293 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The
principle of disproportionality has been acknowledged to apply to both capital and
noncapital sentences.”). At least one subsequent decision reinforced that the Court
would no longer entertain proportionality challenges to noncapital sentences. See
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (per curiam) (refusing a proportionality
review of a forty-year prison sentence and $20,000 fine imposed on a defendant
convicted of possession with intent to distribute nine ounces of marijuana).
119 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274. Such a statement suggests that, at least for a time,
states could punish any offense with any noncapital sentence without being
constrained by the Eighth Amendment.
120 463 U.S. 277, 277–78 (1983).
121 Although not a focal point of the case, perhaps the Court’s opinion in Rhodes
v. Chapman suggested the forthcoming resurgent viability of proportionality
challenges in noncapital cases. 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (“Today the Eighth
Amendment prohibits punishments which . . . are grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime.”). Proportionality challenges also appeared alive and well in
capital cases. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). In Enmund, the Court
considered
whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty
on one such as [petitioner] who aids and abets a felony in the course of
which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill,
attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be
employed.
Id. at 797. In concluding that it does not, the Court surveyed (1) whether states
allow for “the imposition of the death penalty for a vicarious felony murder in their
capital sentencing statutes,” id. at 788–93; (2) the manner in which juries have
reacted to the death penalty when the defendant is not the “triggerman,” id. at 794–
96; and (3) the “‘climate of international opinion,’” id. at 796 n.22 (quoting Coker,
433 U.S. at 596 n.10); accord Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 n.35 (1958). But cf. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 369 n.1 (1989) (“We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that
are dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various amici . . .
that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant.”). Although each
instance revealed a uniform disapproval of capital punishment for vicarious felony
murder, the Court separately interjected its own seemingly subjective analysis to
conclude that petitioner’s punishment was unconstitutionally excessive. See
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798–801. But cf. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 n.15 (“[N]o sentence
of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Enmund’s crime.”).
122 463 U.S. at 280–81.
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the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court reasoned that
petitioner’s crime was “one of the most passive felonies a person
123
could commit.”
Although the Solem Court reiterated that “a criminal
sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the
124
defendant has been convicted,” it cautioned that successful
challenges to the proportionality of noncapital cases would be
125
To clarify the specific utility of
“‘exceedingly rare.’”
proportionality challenges in noncapital cases, the Court advised
reviewing courts to consider, inter alia, certain “objective
criteria,” including: “(i) the gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other
criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other
126
jurisdictions.”
The Court recognized its list was not exhaustive and thus
offered additional considerations: “[A] lesser included offense
should not be punished more severely than the greater offense”;
“an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher
penalty than the principal”; “negligent conduct is less serious
than intentional conduct”; and “[a] court . . . is entitled to look at
127
a defendant’s motive in committing a crime.”
The Court also
highlighted the unique problem of applying Eighth Amendment
proportionality challenges to terms of imprisonment:
For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not so much
one of ordering, but one of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25year sentence generally is more severe than a 15-year sentence,
but in most cases it would be difficult to decide that the former
violates the Eighth Amendment while the latter does not.
Decisions of this kind, although troubling, are not unique to

123 Id. at 296 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that petitioner’s crime
“involved neither violence nor threat of violence to any person”).
124 Id. at 290. “There is no basis for the State’s assertion that the general
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison sentences.” Id. at 288.
125 Id. at 289–90 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)).
126 Id. at 292. The gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty inquiry
tasks a court with considering the seriousness of the crime and comparing it to other
crimes. See id. at 291 (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 597–98). In the same jurisdiction,
“[i]f more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties,
that is some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive.” Id. at 291.
127 Id. at 293; see id. at 296 (noting that “a State is justified in punishing a
recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender”).
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this area. The courts are constantly
called upon to draw
128
similar lines in a variety of contexts.

Of course, as the dissent observed, the Court does not explain
whether “all these factors [must] be present in order to hold a
sentence excessive under the Eighth Amendment” or how the
129
factors are “to be weighed against each other.”
130
In light of the stark conflict between Rummel and Solem,
the Court again confronted a proportionality challenge to a
131
sentence of imprisonment in Harmelin v. Michigan.
In
Harmelin, the Court considered whether a life sentence without
parole for cocaine possession, imposed upon a first-time
132
offender, violated the offender’s Eighth Amendment rights.
Far from resolving the conflict, the Harmelin opinion further
confused whether proportionality challenges to sentences of
133
imprisonment remained viable.
The Court, per Justice Scalia,
held in Part IV of the opinion that petitioner’s sentence did not
violate the Eighth Amendment. Justice Scalia reasoned that
“[o]ur cases creating and clarifying the ‘individualized capital
sentencing doctrine’ have repeatedly suggested that there is no
comparable requirement outside the capital context, because of
the qualitative difference between death and all other
134
penalties.” The Court further reasoned that the phrase “cruel

128

Id. at 294 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 315 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
130 Compare id. at 288 n.13 (majority opinion) (“[The dissent’s] assertion that the
Eighth Amendment establishes only a narrow principle of proportionality is
contrary to the entire line of cases cited in the text.”), with id. at 305 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the majority’s analysis is “completely at odds with the
reasoning of our recent holding in Rummel”).
131 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
132 Id. at 961–62.
133 E.g., Drew v. Tessmer, 195 F. Supp. 2d 887, 890 (E.D. Mich. 2001). In Drew,
“[t]he magistrate judge quoted Harmelin v. Michigan for the notion that Weems
does not announce a constitutional proportionality guarantee.” Id. (citation and
footnote omitted). In correcting the magistrate’s error, the district court observed
that “[a] more careful analysis of Harmelin, however, indicates that there is, in fact,
a requirement of proportionality.” Id. (noting that Part III of Justice Scalia’s
opinion “carries little value . . . since the other seven Justices communicate that
there is such a constitutional requirement”).
134 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995. The so-called “individualized sentencing doctrine,”
as used in capital cases, requires “individualized determinations in capitalsentencing proceedings.” Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 75 (1987). Thus, the
doctrine prohibits mandatory capital-sentencing provisions and constitutionally
129
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and unusual” was historically designed to prohibit certain
135
punishments, but not to guarantee proportionate sentencing.
A majority of Justices only agreed on Part IV of the Court’s
opinion. Seven Justices found the preceding three parts of
136
Justice Scalia’s opinion objectionable;
indeed, only Chief
Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Scalia in announcing, “Solem
was simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains no
137
proportionality guarantee.”
Justice Scalia reasoned that the
totality of factors proposed by the Solem Court to aid in the
proportionality analysis presents “an invitation to imposition of
138
subjective values.”
Thus, according to Justice Scalia, the
Eighth Amendment provides for proportionate sentencing only
139
in the context of capital punishment, if at all.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter,
authored a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment, in which he observed, “the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause encompasses a narrow proportionality
140
principle.”
Although Justice Kennedy conceded that the
majority of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence emerged from
death penalty cases, he nonetheless reaffirmed that “[t]he Eighth
Amendment proportionality principle also applies to noncapital
141
sentences.”
According to Justice Kennedy, the Amendment
provides only a limited proportionality guarantee and thus “does
not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence.
Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly
142
disproportionate’ to the crime.”
To clarify and apparently
streamline his proportionality analysis in relation to Solem,
Justice Kennedy indicated that a reviewing court’s evaluation of
the first Solem factor–the gravity of the offense and the

guarantees to the defendant the ability to present any relevant mitigating evidence
before the sentencing authority can impose death. Id. at 76.
135 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 992–93.
136 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, separately
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justices White, Blackmun,
Stevens, and Marshall dissented.
137 Id. at 965.
138 See id. at 986.
139 Id. at 994.
140 Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
141 Id. (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)).
142 Id. at 1001.
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harshness of the penalty–“may be sufficient to determine the
143
Accordingly,
constitutionality of a particular sentence.”
“intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses [Solem
factors two and three] are appropriate only in the rare case in
which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the
sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross
144
disproportionality.”
Writing for the dissent, Justice White revisited the Court’s
previous Eighth Amendment decisions that, he concluded,
145
reflect a consistent recognition of a proportionality principle.
Justice White asserted that to evaluate a proportionality
challenge to a sentence of imprisonment, the factor test outlined
in Solem objectively assesses “a given sentence’s constitutional
proportionality, giving due deference to ‘public attitudes
146
concerning a particular sentence.’”
In contrast, Justice White
argued, Justice Scalia’s approach relied too heavily on a
147
148
historical analysis without addressing prior Court precedent.
The dissenters also disapproved of Justice Kennedy’s opinion
and asserted that his streamlined approach to proportionality
directly contradicted the Solem Court’s directive that “‘no one
factor will be dispositive in a given case,’ and ‘no single criterion
can identify when a sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it
violates the Eighth Amendment,’ ‘[b]ut a combination of
149
objective factors can make such analysis possible.’”
Thus,
according to the dissent, Justice Scalia delivered “a swift death
sentence to Solem” and Justice Kennedy “prefer[red] to
150
eviscerate it, leaving only an empty shell.”
Since Harmelin, the Court has not had occasion to specify the
extent to which the Eighth Amendment guarantees

143

Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1005.
145 Id. at 1012 (White, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 1021.
147 Id. at 1011 n.1. Moreover, the dissent recognized, “the Court’s jurisprudence
concerning the scope of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments has
long understood the limitations of a purely historical analysis.” Id. at 1014.
148 See id. at 1013 (“Not only is it undeniable that our cases have construed the
Eighth Amendment to embody a proportionality component, but it is also evident
that none of the Court’s cases suggest that such a construction is impermissible.”).
149 Id. at 1019 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 n.17 (1983)).
150 Id. at 1018.
144
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proportionate sentencing in noncapital cases. But the Court
seemingly adopted Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Harmelin
as the lens through which to view Eighth Amendment challenges
151
152
to terms of imprisonment.
Indeed, in Ewing v. California, a
Court plurality affirmed the constitutionality of petitioner’s
sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison pursuant to
153
California’s Three Strikes law. In doing so, the Court rejected
petitioner’s argument that his sentence was grossly
disproportionate to his most recent crime–grand theft of golf
154
clubs valued at roughly $1200.
In weighing the gravity of
155
petitioner’s offense, the Court held that petitioner’s sentence
did not raise an inference of gross disproportionality, citing both
156
his current offense and long history of felony recidivism.
It

151 E.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23–24 (2003) (“The proportionality
principles in our cases distilled in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence guide our
application of the Eighth Amendment in the new context that we are called upon to
consider.”). The Court’s approach comports with the interpretation of Harmelin
adopted by a majority of Circuit Courts. See, e.g., Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d
706, 709 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Since Harmelin, our court and others have applied the
principles outlined in Mr. Justice Kennedy’s opinion to [Eighth Amendment]
cases . . . .”); United States v. Jones, 213 F.3d 1253, 1261 (10th Cir. 2000) (“We have
ruled that Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion . . . sets forth the applicable Eighth
Amendment test.”); United States v. Harris, 154 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“Our court follows the narrow proportionality rule established by Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Harmelin . . . .”); United States v. Hill, 30 F.3d 48, 50 (6th
Cir. 1994) (“In reviewing Eighth Amendment challenges, this circuit has adhered to
the ‘narrow proportionality principle’ articulated in Harmelin v. Michigan.”
(citation omitted)); United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 128–29 (9th Cir. 1992)
(calling Justice Kennedy’s test “the holding in Harmelin” because it is the “position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment[] on the narrowest
grounds”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
152 538 U.S. at 11.
153 Id. at 20.
154 Id. at 17–18. Petitioner stole the clubs while on parole from a nine-year prison
term for first-degree robbery and multiple counts of residential burglary. Id. His
subsequent conviction was his fifteenth, for which he had previously served nine
separate terms of incarceration. Id. at 18.
155 By weighing the gravity of petitioner’s offense, the Court’s analysis suggests a
tacit return to the Solem factors. Yet, as the Kennedy concurrence in Harmelin
observed, Solem “did not mandate” a subsequent comparative analysis “within and
between jurisdictions.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004–05 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
156 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (noting that petitioner’s crime was “certainly not ‘one of
the most passive felonies a person could commit’” (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 296 (1983))).
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specifically observed that petitioner’s lengthy criminal history
157
reflected a pattern of increasing violence.
158
Similarly, in Lockyer v. Andrade, a federal habeas corpus
proceeding, the Court rejected a gross disproportionality claim
from petitioner who stole videotapes worth $153 from two K159
Mart stores on separate occasions in November 1995.
Petitioner Andrade was sentenced, in light of his prior theft160
related offenses, to two consecutive Three Strikes sentences of
twenty-five years to life, with no eligibility for parole until he
161
served fifty years in prison.
The Supreme Court held that
because “the precise contours” of the gross disproportionality
principle were “unclear,” the state court of appeals made an
objectively reasonable application of clearly established federal
162
law by upholding petitioner’s sentence.
Indeed, reasoned the
Court, legislatures enjoy broad discretion in crafting appropriate
sentences for recidivists; thus, given petitioner’s lengthy prior
record, the state court of appeals appropriately concluded that
petitioner’s sentence was not an “extraordinary case” producing
163
an unconstitutional sentence.
The foregoing decisions suggest that non-habeas corpus
defendants sentenced to life in prison without parole have two
ways to challenge their sentence pursuant to the Eighth
164
Amendment. First, such a defendant may argue that, pursuant
to Trop v. Dulles, the punishment is unconstitutional because the
157

Id. at 29–30.
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
159 Id. at 66.
160 Petitioner’s criminal history included the following activities: multiple counts
of burglary, for which he was sentenced to 120 months in prison; misdemeanor
theft, for which he was sentenced to six days in jail with a year of probation;
transportation of marijuana, for which he was sentenced to eight years in federal
prison; misdemeanor theft, for which he was sentenced to 180 days in jail; and
transportation of marijuana, for which he was sentenced to 2191 days in federal
prison. Id. at 66–67. He was also arrested for a state parole violation arising from
his escape from federal prison. Id. at 67.
161 Id. at 66.
162 Id. at 72–73 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Through this thicket of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, one governing legal principle emerges as ‘clearly
established’ under § 2254(d)(1): A gross disproportionality principle is applicable to
sentences for terms of years.” Id. at 72).
163 Id. at 76–77.
164 Accord Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1996); Foster v. Withrow,
159 F. Supp. 2d 629, 644 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
158
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“evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
165
This defendant therefore bears a
maturing society” reject it.
heavy burden to demonstrate that the evolving standards of
decency disallow the challenged punishment by relying on the
166
enactments from state legislatures nationwide.
In considering
a defendant’s challenge to a life without parole sentence, a
reviewing court must specifically consider: (1) whether a
167
nationwide consensus favors the challenged punishment, (2)
the extent to which the behavior of juries and prosecutors invoke
168
the challenged punishment, (3) its own judgment by focusing
on whether the challenged punishment furthers legitimate
169
170
penological goals, and (4) the climate of international law.
Second, that same defendant alternatively could proffer a
171
proportionality argument.
Today, an evaluation of this
challenge requires a mix of Solem, Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence in Harmelin, and the considerations prevalent in
172
both Ewing and Lockyer.
Any analysis must focus on
165

356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369–71 (1989).
167 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370;
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822 n.7 (1988).
168 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822 n.7; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373; see Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (noting that jury determinations and
legislative enactments are “two crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency
respecting the imposition of punishment in our society”).
169 Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823 n.8 (citing Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1987)).
170 Roper, 543 U.S. at 576–78; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
171 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997–98 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Significantly, “[f]ederal courts will not engage in a proportionality
analysis except in cases where the penalty imposed is death or life in prison without
possibility of parole.” United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 1995).
172 Before Solem, state courts often utilized a variety of subjective standards. See,
e.g., Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1968) (evaluating punishment by
examining whether it is “completely arbitrary” and “shocking to the sense of
justice”); State v. Espinosa, 421 P.2d 322, 325 (Ariz. 1966) (evaluating punishment
by asking whether it is “approximately proportionate to the type of crime and not
so severe as to shock the moral sense of the community”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 930 (Cal. 1972) (holding that a punishment is
constitutionally disproportionate if it “shocks the conscience and offends
fundamental notions of human dignity”); Normand v. People, 440 P.2d 282, 284
(Colo. 1968) (upholding punishment “where it does not shock the conscience of the
court”); State v. Evans, 245 P.2d 788, 792 (Idaho 1952) (invalidating sentences if
they are so disproportionate “as to shock the conscience of reasonable men”);
Cannon v. Gladden, 281 P.2d 233, 235 (Or. 1955) (holding that a punishment is
unconstitutional if it would “shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what
166
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“objective factors” and begin with evaluating the “gravity of the
173
As Ewing and
offense and the harshness of the penalty.”
Lockyer make clear, this requires a reviewing court to consider
174
both the crime’s severity and defendant’s criminal history.
Unless defendant’s sentence leads to an inference of
175
disproportionality, the inquiry likely ends there.
Assuming defendant’s crime is nonviolent or otherwise
176
passive,
however, a reviewing court may evaluate the
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction
177
(the “inter-jurisdictional” analysis), and the sentences imposed
for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions (the
178
“intra-jurisdictional” analysis).
In doing so, a court must be
179
The Solem
mindful of the additional Solem pronouncements.
factors, however, are rarely helpful because “[o]utside the
context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the
proportionality of particular sentences [will be] exceedingly
180
rare.”
is right and proper”). Notwithstanding the Solem decision, at least one court
continued using a subjective standard. Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 596 N.E.2d 325,
331 (Mass. 1992) (invalidating a punishment that “shocks the conscience and
offends fundamental notions of human dignity”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But see State v. Bonner, 577 N.W.2d 575, 579 (S.D. 1998) (rejecting the
“shocks the conscience” test and employing the set of principles articulated in
Justice Kennedy’s Harmelin concurrence).
173 See Solem v. Helms, 463 U.S. 277, 290–91 (1983) (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at
597–98).
174 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003).
175 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004–05 (Kennedy, J., concurring); accord James v.
Kernan, No. C 03-0020, 2007 WL 879071, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2007) (“The
threshold for an ‘inference of gross disproportionality’ is quite high.” (citing Ewing,
538 U.S. at 30)).
176 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (evaluating whether petitioner’s crime was a
“passive felony”); Solem, 463 U.S. at 296 (same).
177 Solem, 463 U.S. at 291.
178 Id. at 292.
179 Id. at 293–94.
180 Id. at 289–90 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted)
(quotation marks omitted). The Court’s words were indeed prophetic; successful
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences are exceedingly rare. See,
e.g., United States v. Cupa-Guillen, 34 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A] sentence
within the limits set by a valid statute may not be overturned on appeal as cruel and
unusual punishment unless the sentence is so ‘grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime’ as to shock our sense of justice.” (quoting United States v.
Vega-Mejia, 611 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1979))); United States v. Atteberry, 447
F.3d 562, 565 (8th Cir. 2006) (“A sentence within the statutory limits is generally
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B. Juvenile Offenders, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court
Historically, the Supreme Court has accommodated for the
differences between children and adults by affording children
181
greater legal protection.
Due to children’s underdeveloped
maturity, poor rationality, and their adult potential, reviewing
courts traditionally have given children special consideration
when determining whether their sentences violate the Eighth

not subject to [Eighth Amendment] review.” (alteration in original)); United States
v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the “Eighth
Amendment condemns only punishment that shocks the collective conscience of
society”); see also Kathi A. Drew & R. K. Weaver, Disproportionate or Excessive
Punishments: Is There a Method for Successful Constitutional Challenges?, 2 TEX.
WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 19 (1995) (“In the literally hundreds of cases dealing with
proportionality since Harmelin, the federal courts have not declared a single prison
sentence to be disproportionate.”). But cf. Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755 (9th Cir.
2004). In Ramirez, defendant was caught walking out of a Sears department store
in broad daylight carrying a $199 VCR for which he had not paid. Id. at 756.
Although defendant immediately surrendered to authorities and returned the VCR
(and the state could have charged him with a misdemeanor), the prosecution
charged him with one count of petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction
(defendant had a prior record). Id. After his conviction, defendant was sentenced
to life pursuant to California’s “Three Strikes” law. Id. After considering the
objective factors of defendant’s case and performing the fact-specific analysis of his
criminal history, the court held that this was an “exceedingly rare” case in which the
sentence imposed was grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed and
therefore violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 762–75.
The court’s decision in Ramirez, however, clearly represents an isolated instance.
Indeed, the great majority of cases reject defendants’ Eighth Amendment
proportionality challenges. See, e.g., Little v. Butler, 848 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding twenty-five-year sentence for attempted armed robbery not
disproportionate); United States v. Oglesby, 764 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding same for twenty-year sentence for armed robbery); Hanks v. Jackson, 123
F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1075 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding same for twenty- to fifty-year
sentence for armed robbery); Atkins v. Overton, 843 F. Supp. 258, 261–62 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) (holding same for ten- to thirty-year sentence for armed robbery).
181 See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (“Children, by definition,
are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves.”); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (“Our history is replete with laws and
judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less
mature and responsible than adults.”); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 636 (1979)
(reviewing and reiterating “the Court’s concern over the inability of children to
make mature choices”); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (noting that “a
state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with
children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized”); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 649–50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (observing that children
do not possess “full capacity for individual choice”).
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182

Amendment.
Three cases in particular best trace the Court’s
approach to juvenile criminal defendants.
1. Thompson v. Oklahoma
In 1988, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that children hold a
183
184
in Thompson v. Oklahoma,
“very special place in life”
wherein a fifteen-year-old boy and three others “actively
participated” in the murder of petitioner’s former brother-in185
law. The victim was shot twice; his throat, chest, and abdomen
were cut; he had several bruises and a broken leg; and his body
186
was chained to a concrete block and thrown in a river.
Petitioner was sentenced to death for his role and, after the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, the Supreme
187
Court granted certiorari to consider, in part, whether a death
sentence is cruel and unusual punishment for a fifteen-year-old
188
who participated in a murder.
In holding that “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age
at the time of his or her offense,” a Court plurality considered
whether contemporary standards of decency allowed a juvenile
to act with the degree of culpability that justifies capital
189
190
punishment.
To facilitate its Trop analysis,
the Court
182

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988).
Id. at 825 n.23 (quoting May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
184 Id. at 815.
185 Id. at 819 (declining to delineate petitioner’s specific role in the offense).
186 Id. at 819.
187 At the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial, the prosecutor admitted three
photographs depicting the victim’s condition upon his removal from the river. Id. at
820. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that the admission of two of
the photographs–although erroneous–was nonetheless harmless because of the
overwhelming evidence of petitioner’s guilt. Id. The prosecutor, however, also
used the photographs in his closing argument at the penalty phase; the Oklahoma
court did not consider the propriety of this practice. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court
was also asked to review “whether photographic evidence that a state court deems
erroneously admitted but harmless at the guilt phase nevertheless violates a capital
defendant’s constitutional rights by virtue of its being considered at the penalty
phase.” Id. at 820–21. Given the Court’s resolution of the Eighth Amendment
issue, however, it declined to consider this second question. Id. at 838 n.48.
188 Id. at 820–21.
189 Id. at 822–23, 838. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, authored the plurality opinion; Justice O’Connor separately concurred;
and Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and White, dissented.
183
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examined legislative enactments, jury sentences,
and
recognized that ultimately its own judgment would determine
192
“the acceptability of the death penalty” in this instance.
The Court first considered pertinent legislative enactments
and observed that Oklahoma, like several other states, prohibits
minors from (1) voting, (2) sitting on a jury, (3) marrying
without parental consent, and (4) purchasing alcohol or
193
cigarettes.
Additionally, Oklahoma retains a juvenile-justice
system in which most offenders under age eighteen are not held
194
criminally responsible for their actions.
The Court closely
surveyed state law to explore how other states treat minors in
relation to voting, jury service, driving privileges, marriage, the
purchase of pornographic materials, gambling, and the
195
maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction.
Taken together,
the Court reasoned, “[a]ll of this legislation is consistent with the
experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our law,
that the normal 15-year-old is not prepared to assume the full
196
responsibilities of an adult.”

190 Although not explicitly stated in the opinion, the Court presumably declined
to engage in a strict proportionality analysis because “there [was] no claim that the
punishment would be excessive if the crime had been committed by an adult.” Id.
at 819. But cf. id. at 853 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (criticizing Part V of the
plurality opinion for employing a “kind of disproportionality analysis”).
191 Id. at 822 n.7 (plurality opinion).
192 Id. at 823 n.8 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
193 Id. at 823.
194 Id. at 823–24. The Court did, however, observe that Oklahoma considers a
sixteen- or seventeen-year-old charged with murder (or other serious felonies) an
adult and, using a “special certification procedure,” defendants who are petitioner’s
age could similarly be charged as an adult. Id. at 824.
195 Id. at 824–25.
196 Id. But cf. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (“It is, to begin
with, absurd to think that one must be mature enough to drive carefully, to drink
responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in order to be mature enough to understand
that murdering another human being is profoundly wrong, and to conform one’s
conduct to that most minimal of all civilized standards.”).
The Court subsequently examined the minimum age for the imposition of capital
punishment and realized that, of the eighteen states “that have expressly established
a minimum age in their death penalty statutes, . . . all of them require that the
defendant have attained at least the age of 16 at the time of the capital offense.”
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829. The Court thereafter confirmed the wisdom of state
law by reflecting on international customs and noted, “The conclusion that it would
offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person who was less than 16 years
old at the time of [the] offense is consistent with . . . other nations that share our
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Second, the Court investigated the “behavior of juries” to
determine whether the death penalty was administered to
197
juveniles in an unguided fashion.
Statistics from the
Department of Justice revealed a startling reality: of the 1392
defendants sentenced to death between 1982 and 1986, only five
(including petitioner) were less than sixteen years old at the time
198
of their offense.
According to the Court, “[s]tatistics of this
kind . . . suggest that these five young offenders have received
sentences that are ‘cruel and unusual in the same way that being
199
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.’”
Finally, the Court exercised its own judgment to conclude that
sentencing petitioner to death violated the Eighth
200
Amendment.
In doing so, the Court emphasized that a
juvenile’s criminal behavior should not be measured using adult
201
standards.
Unlike adults, juveniles–including adolescents–
202
Justice Stevens
exhibit less maturity and responsibility.
succinctly articulated:
[L]ess culpability should attach to a crime committed by a
juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult.
The basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended
explanation. Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence
make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of
his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much
more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure
than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted
with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain
why their irresponsible
conduct is not as morally reprehensible
203
as that of an adult.

Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western European
community.” Id. at 830.
197 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831.
198 Id. at 832–33.
199 Id. at 833 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
200 Id. at 833–38. Notwithstanding a self-described exercise of its own judgment,
the Court constrained its inquiry to evaluating first whether juveniles and adults
should be held to equivalent standards and, second, whether administering capital
punishment to juveniles facilitates the societal purposes underlying the death
penalty. Id. at 833.
201 Id. at 833–38.
202 Id. at 834.
203 Id. at 835 (footnotes omitted).
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2. Stanford v. Kentucky
One year after its decision in Thompson, the Court in
204
considered whether imposing capital
Stanford v. Kentucky
punishment on individuals for crimes committed at sixteen or
seventeen constituted cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to
the Eighth Amendment. The Stanford petitioners argued that
sentencing them to death would violate the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments because they were juveniles at the time of their
205
crimes.
Specifically, they contended, pursuant to Trop, that
“their punishment is contrary to the ‘evolving standards of
206
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”
To evaluate petitioners’ challenges, the Court again turned
first to state and federal legislative enactments. Of the thirtyseven states that authorized capital punishment, fifteen states
refused to impose the death penalty on sixteen-year-olds and
207
twelve states refused to impose it on seventeen-year-olds.
This, according to the Court, was insufficient to establish “the
degree of national consensus . . . previously thought sufficient to
208
label a particular punishment cruel and unusual.”
Although
no federal death penalty for sixteen- or seventeen-year-old
offenders existed, the Court viewed this as insufficient to
demonstrate a national consensus against using capital
punishment for sixteen- or seventeen-year-old juvenile
209
defendants.

204 492 U.S. 361, 364–65 (1989). Specifically, the Stanford Court considered the
cases of two juvenile murder defendants from Kentucky and Missouri, respectively.
The first, seventeen-year-old Kevin Stanford, was convicted of murder, first-degree
sodomy, first-degree robbery, and receiving stolen property, and was sentenced to
death and forty-five years in prison after he and an accomplice: (1) repeatedly raped
and sodomized a gas station attendant; (2) robbed the gas station; and (3) drove the
attendant to a secluded area near the station where Stanford shot her in the face
and in the back of the head. Id. at 365–66. The second defendant, sixteen-year-old
Heath Wilkins, fatally stabbed a twenty-six-year-old mother of two who was
working behind the sales counter of the convenience store she and her husband
owned and operated in Missouri. Id. at 366.
205 Id. at 368.
206 Id. at 369 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
207 Id. at 370.
208 Id. at 370–71.
209 Id. at 372–73.
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Petitioners nonetheless argued that contemporary societal
attitudes showed juries’ reluctance to impose the death penalty
on sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds and a corresponding
210
prosecutorial reluctance to seek such sentences.
For support,
petitioners relied on statistics reflecting that, from 1982 to 1988,
only fifteen of 2106 death sentences were imposed on sixteenyear-old offenders and only thirty on defendants who were
211
seventeen at the time of their offense.
The Court dismissed
these statistics and relied on “the undisputed fact that a far
smaller percentage of capital crimes are committed by persons
212
under 18 than over 18.”
At this point, the Stanford Court’s approach differed from the
Thompson Court. In a last-ditch effort, petitioners urged the
Court to exercise its “own informed judgment” to hold that
imposing the death penalty in this context would not serve
legitimate penological goals because it would fail to deter
213
juveniles.
In response, the Court observed that petitioners’
argument has no place in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and,
unlike in Thompson, “emphatically reject[ed]” petitioners’
214
request for the Court to exercise its own judgment. The Court
concluded that no historical or current national consensus
existed against capital punishment for sixteen- or seventeen210

Id. at 373.
Id.
212 Id. at 374.
213 Id. at 377–78 (quotation marks omitted).
Petitioners also attempted to
demonstrate a national consensus against capital punishment for sixteen- and
seventeen-year-old offenders by offering “public opinion polls, the views of interest
groups, and the positions adopted by various professional associations.” Id. at 377.
Such evidence, however, has no role in determining the constitutionality of
punishment; indeed, only through the judgments of legislatures could petitioners
establish the requisite national consensus. Id.
214 Id. at 378. But cf. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833 (1988) (“‘[I]t is
for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the
death penalty’ on one such as petitioner who committed a heinous murder when he
was only 15 years old.” (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982))).
The Court’s decision in Stanford not to exercise its own judgment now appears
anomalous. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (“[T]o the extent
Stanford was based on a rejection of the idea that this Court is required to bring its
independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the death penalty for a
particular class of crimes or offenders, . . . it suffices to note that this rejection was
inconsistent with prior Eighth Amendment decisions.” (citations omitted)); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002) (“[I]n cases involving a consensus, our own
judgment is ‘brought to bear’ by asking whether there is reason to disagree with the
judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.” (citation omitted)).
211
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year-old murderers and, as a result, imposing such a sentence
215
does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
3. Roper v. Simmons
To resolve the conflict between Thompson and Stanford, the
Court revisited the relationship between juvenile punishment
216
At the age
and the Eighth Amendment in Roper v. Simmons.
217
of seventeen, respondent Christopher Simmons entered the
victim’s home with an accomplice after dark and used duct tape
218
to cover the victim’s eyes and mouth and bind her hands.
They then put the victim in her own minivan and drove her to a
state park where they walked her to a railroad trestle and threw
219
her from the bridge.
Within days, authorities received
information that led to respondent’s arrest, confession, and
220
videotaped reenactment of the crime.
Following a jury trial,
respondent was found guilty of first-degree murder and
221
sentenced to death.

215 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380. Ultimately, neither petitioner was executed. In
June 2003, then-Kentucky Governor Paul Patton commuted Kevin Stanford’s death
sentence to life in prison. See Andrew Wolfson, Patton Pardons 4 in Election Case
and Will Commute Death Sentence; Stanford’s Family Celebrates; Victim’s Sister Is
Repulsed, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), June 19, 2003, at 1A (announcing
commutation of Stanford’s sentence but declining to specify the terms); Andrew
Wolfson, Governor Will Spare Jefferson Killer’s Life, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 26, 2003, at 6A (announcing formal terms of commutation).
Earlier, on May 16, 1996, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Missouri ordered the State to allow Heath Wilkins to withdraw his plea of guilty.
Wilkins v. Bowersox, 933 F. Supp. 1496, 1526 (W.D. Mo. 1996), aff’d, 145 F.3d 1006
(8th Cir. 1998). The court held that Wilkins was not mentally competent when he
waived his right to counsel. Id. at 1515. Wilkins subsequently received three
consecutive life sentences after pleading guilty in Clay County Circuit Court to
second-degree murder, armed robbery, and armed criminal action. Associated
Press, Youngest Ever Sent to Death Row Gets Three Life Sentences, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, May 22, 1999, at 17.
216 543 U.S. at 551.
217 Testimony during a postconviction hearing revealed that respondent was
immature, impulsive, and easily influenced. Id. at 559. Evidently, respondent also
endured a difficult childhood and performed poorly in school as a teenager. Id.
Although respondent was also a frequent alcohol and drug user, id., he had no
criminal record prior to committing murder, id. at 558.
218 Id. at 556.
219 Id. at 556–57.
220 Id. at 557.
221 Id. at 557–58.
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As Simmons submitted a series of failed post conviction filings
222
in state appellate court, the Supreme Court issued its decision
223
in Atkins v. Virginia, wherein it held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a mentally
224
retarded person.
Based on the reasoning of Atkins,
respondent filed a new petition for state postconviction relief,
contending that the Constitution precluded executing a juvenile
225
who was under eighteen at the time of the crime.
The
Missouri Supreme Court agreed and resentenced respondent to
222

Id. at 558–59.
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
224 Id. at 321. Initially, the Eighth Amendment did not mandate a categorical
exemption from the death penalty for the mentally retarded. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302, 340 (1989). In reaching this conclusion, the Penry Court stressed that only
two states had enacted laws banning the imposition of the death penalty on a
mentally retarded person convicted of a capital offense. Id. at 334. Yet, when
revisiting the issue in Atkins, the Court reached the opposite conclusion. Relying
on the changed legal landscape, the court observed that “[t]he practice . . . has
become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has developed
against it.” 536 U.S. at 316.
Interestingly, despite the Court’s Atkins opinion, the petitioner in Penry, Johnny
Paul Penry, still faced the possibility of execution until earlier this year. Mike
Tolson, Penry’s Fate to Be Weighed a 4th Time; He’s Set to Face a Jury in June for
Sentencing in ’79 Murder, HOUSTON CHRON., May 14, 2007, at B1. After navigating
nearly three decades worth of legal twists and turns, Penry finally reached an
agreement with prosecutors in February 2008 to serve three consecutive life
sentences. Mike Tolson, An End to a Legal Saga: Deal Keeps Penry Imprisoned for
Life, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb 16, 2008, at B1. As part of the agreement, Penry’s
lawyers agreed that Penry was competent to stand trial and that at all times during
the criminal proceedings he was not mentally retarded. Elizabeth White, State
Won’t Seek Death Penalty Against Convicted Killer, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 16,
2008.
Interestingly, since Atkins, the petitioner Daryl Atkins has not left death row.
David G. Savage, IQ Debate Unsettled in Death Penalty Cases; The Supreme Court
Ruled Against Executing the Mentally Retarded, but Defining that Group has Proved
Difficult, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2007, at A1. Although, as noted, the Atkins decision
prohibits the execution of mentally retarded defendants, prosecutors in Atkins
remain focused on proving that Atkins is not mentally retarded. Id. In August
2007, lawyers for Atkins were scheduled to try again to convince a jury that Atkins
is mentally retarded and “therefore deserves a life term in prison, not execution.”
Id. Before that hearing could occur, however, Atkins’ sentence was commuted to
life when his codefendant’s attorney came forward with his belief that prosecutors
committed misconduct by coaching a witness and hiding it from the defense at the
time of Atkins’s trial. Donna St. George, Death Sentence Commuted in Va. Case;
Prosecutor Action is Issue, Not Mental Status of Defendant, WASH. POST, Jan. 18,
2008, at B1. Prosecutors have since appealed the commutation of Atkins’ sentence.
Danielle Zielinski, Atkins Will Remain on Death Row Pending Appeal, DAILY
PRESS (Newport, Va.), Feb. 7, 2008.
225 Roper, 543 U.S. at 559.
223
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life in prison without parole, after which the Supreme Court
226
granted certiorari.
In affirming the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit executing individuals under the age of
227
eighteen.
Like the analysis in Thompson and Stanford, the
Roper Court began by examining the constitutionality of a
juvenile death penalty by considering the “national
228
consensus.”
In reviewing legislative changes since Stanford,
the Court observed that “[f]ive [s]tates that allowed the juvenile
death penalty at the time of Stanford have abandoned it in the
intervening fifteen years–four through legislative enactments
229
and one through judicial decision.”
Although such changes
reflected a “less dramatic” trend than in Atkins, the Court
nonetheless viewed the development as significant, particularly
when considered alongside the infrequent use of juvenile capital
230
punishment in states that allow the practice.
Taken together,
the evidence reflected that juveniles are “‘categorically less
231
culpable than the average criminal.’”
Unlike the Thompson and Stanford Courts, the Roper Court
did not consider the attitudes of contemporary society through
jury verdicts and the actions of prosecutors. Instead, the Court
directly exercised its own judgment to demonstrate why the
232
death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juveniles.
To prove that juveniles cannot be classified among the worst
offenders, the Roper Court, like the Thompson Court,
highlighted differences between adults and juveniles: (1)
226

Id. at 560.
Id. at 578. The Court’s decision in Roper evidently resonated most in Texas,
which houses more than one-third of the country’s convicts who were sentenced to
death for crimes they committed as juveniles. Maro Robbins, Justices Rule Teen
Killers Can’t Be Put to Death; Decision Could Have the Biggest Impact on Texas,
Which Has the Most Kids Sentenced to Be Executed, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESSNEWS, March 2, 2005, at A1.
228 543 U.S. at 564.
229 Id. at 565.
230 Id. at 565, 566–67.
231 Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316) (2002).
232 The Atkins Court likewise followed this approach. 536 U.S. at 313 (“[W]e
shall first review the judgment of legislatures that have addressed the suitability of
imposing the death penalty on the mentally retarded and then consider reasons for
agreeing or disagreeing with their judgment.”).
227
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juveniles lack the maturity of adults and possess an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility, (2) juveniles are more
susceptible to peer pressure, and (3) “the character of a juvenile
233
is not as well formed as that of an adult.”
Thus, according to
the Court, “[o]nce the diminished culpability of juveniles is
recognized, it is evident that the penological justifications for the
234
death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults.”
Finally, the Court considered, for the first time in detail, the
climate of international law. The Court observed that Article 37
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child–
ratified by every country except the United States and
Somalia–expressly prohibits capital punishment for juvenile
235
offenders under age eighteen.
Only seven countries other
than the United States have executed juvenile offenders since
1990 and, since then, these countries have either abolished
236
capital punishment or publicly renounced the practice.
Although its examination of international law was not
dispositive, the Court concluded that “[t]he opinion of the world
community . . . provide[s] respected and significant confirmation
237
for our own conclusions.”
And, yet, the foregoing cases leave unclear the manner in
which the Court might evaluate a juvenile’s proportionality
238
challenge.
Some anecdotal language from the Court’s
opinions suggests that a juvenile accomplice convicted of felony
murder could not proffer a proportionality challenge to a
239
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.

233

Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
Id. at 571.
235 Id. at 576.
236 Id. at 577.
237 Id. at 578.
238 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (noting “that our precedents
in this area have not been a model of clarity” (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 965 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.))). “Indeed, in determining whether a
particular sentence for a term of years can violate the Eighth Amendment, we have
not established a clear or consistent path for courts to follow.” Id. (citing Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11, 20–23 (2003)).
239 Compare Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (“[Petitioner] did not
kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the
robbers who killed; yet the State treated them alike and attributed to [petitioner]
the culpability of those who killed the [victims]. This was impermissible under the
Eighth Amendment.”), with Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.15 (1983) (“[N]o
234
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That said, however, the Supreme Court has not yet had occasion
to consider such a challenge and, more specifically, a challenge
from a minimal-role juvenile murder accomplice who, for
240
example, participated by serving as a mere lookout. Given the
potential uncertainty surrounding the viability of this challenge,
this Article will assume for purposes of discussion that only in a
narrow set of circumstances, discussed in Part III below, might a
juvenile proffer a proportionality challenge to a sentence of life
in prison following a murder conviction.
C. Applying the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence to Juvenile Punishment in the Lower Courts
Authors have widely discussed the evolving philosophies
241
underlying the existence of the juvenile court system and its
242
Some commentators
increasingly harsh juvenile penalties.
contend that the imposition of harsher juvenile penalties began
243
in response to a perceived increase in juvenile crime.
Others

sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Enmund’s crime [of
felony-murder].”).
240 Compare People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 308 (Ill. 2002) (reversing life
sentence for juvenile murder accomplice), with Swinford v. State, 653 So. 2d 912,
918 (Miss. 1995) (upholding trial court’s sentence of life imprisonment for fourteenyear-old who aided and abetted murder). Both of these cases are subsequently
discussed in more depth.
241 See, e.g., Marisa Slaten, Note, Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court: Whose
Right Is It Anyway?, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 824–26 (2003); Mary E. Spring,
Comment, Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecution: A New Approach to the
Problem of Juvenile Delinquency in Illinois, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1351, 1356–58
(1998). A majority of commentators agree that the juvenile justice system shifted
from rehabilitation to retribution, the goal of the criminal justice system, following
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). See,
e.g., Jon-Michael Foxworth, An Unjust Act: The Schizophrenic State of Maturity and
Culpability in Juvenile Justice and Minor Abortion Rights Law; Recent Trends in
Virginia and Nationally, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 495, 498 (2003); Lynda E.
Frost & Adrienne E. Volenick, The Ethical Perils of Representing the Juvenile
Defendant Who May Be Incompetent, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 327, 332 (2004);
Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 375, 390
(1996).
242 E.g., Judith L. Hunter, They Grow Up So Fast: When Juveniles Commit Adult
Crimes: A Dilemma for the Juvenile System, 29 AKRON L. REV. 473, 473–74 (1996)
(noting rise in violent crime committed by youth).
243 See Jarod K. Hofacket, Justice or Vengeance: How Young Is Too Young for a
Child to Be Tried and Punished As an Adult?, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 159, 164
(2002); Hon. W. Don Reader, They Grow Up So Fast: When Juveniles Commit
Adult Crimes: The Laws of Unintended Results, 29 AKRON L. REV. 477, 480 (1996).
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maintain that juvenile institutions were largely unable to
244
Regardless of the reason for
rehabilitate juveniles effectively.
harsher penalties, a review of the judiciary’s approach reflects a
dynamic shift in favor of upholding the more severe punishment
of juveniles convicted of heinous felonies. Indeed, as the
philosophy behind the juvenile system of justice has changed, so
too have prevailing attitudes in the judiciary.
Whether life in prison without the possibility of parole is a
constitutionally permissible sentence for juveniles, for a time,
seemed an open question. In 1968, the Kentucky Supreme
245
Court squarely held, in Workman v. Commonwealth, that life
imprisonment without the benefit of parole is cruel and unusual
246
punishment when applied to juvenile offenders.
In Workman,
two fourteen-year-old defendants forcibly raped a seventy-oneyear-old woman, after which they were convicted and sentenced
247
to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
The court
held that this punishment was “cruel and unusual” by reasoning
“that life imprisonment without benefit of parole for two
fourteen-year-old youths under all the circumstances shocks the
general conscience of society today and is intolerable to
248
fundamental fairness.”
In tacitly highlighting a juvenile’s
potential for rehabilitation, the court further reasoned that “it is
impossible to make a judgment that a fourteen-year-old youth,
no matter how bad, will remain incorrigible for the rest of his
249
life.”
Over the following eleven years, a series of state court
opinions suggested that Workman would stand as an anomalous
250
decision.
For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in 1974,
244 See Randi-Lynn Smallheer, Note, Sentence Blending and the Promise of
Rehabilitation: Bringing the Juvenile Justice System Full Circle, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV.
259, 266 (1999).
245 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968).
246 Id. at 378. The Kentucky Supreme Court later remarked that the Workman
decision “was not whimsical” and “was based on the fact that juveniles have
historically been labeled as a separate class. We think the distinction is a rational
one.” Fryrear v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Ky. 1974).
247 Workman, 429 S.W.2d at 375–76.
248 Id. at 378.
249 Id.
250 See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 515 S.W.2d 79, 86–87 (Ark. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 930 (1975); White v. State, 374 So. 2d 843, 847 (Miss. 1979); State v. Forrester,
587 P.2d 179, 189 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978); see also People v. Isitt, 127 Cal. Rptr. 279,
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upheld a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of
parole for a first-degree rape conviction imposed upon a
251
Then, in
defendant who was seventeen at the time of trial.
1978, the Washington Court of Appeals upheld a life sentence
given to a seventeen-year-old defendant who was convicted,
252
following a jury trial, of first-degree murder.
Finally, in 1979,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed a sixteen-year-old
male’s sentence of life imprisonment without parole for the
armed robbery of $21 against his assertion that it was cruel and
253
unusual punishment.
Given that the defendants in each case
were relatively close to the age of majority at the time of their
crimes, however, the question of “how young is too young” to
254
sentence a juvenile to life imprisonment persisted.
The 1980s offered little additional guidance and reignited the
question of whether the Eighth Amendment permitted
sentencing the juvenile felon to life without parole. Although
state courts affirmed life sentences without parole imposed upon
255
a fourteen-year-old convicted of murder and a fifteen-year-old
285 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (upholding life sentence given to seventeen-year-old
(without discussing defendant’s age) following his conviction for kidnapping and
robbery with bodily harm); State v. Spence, 367 A.2d 983, 989 (Del. 1976) (holding
life sentence for juvenile of an unspecified age is constitutional).
251 Rogers, 515 S.W.2d at 86–87.
252 Forrester, 587 P.2d at 189. In Forrester, defendant murdered an elderly couple
in their home by slashing their throats, shooting one, and stabbing the other. Id. at
182.
253 White, 374 So. 2d at 847. In White, defendant and two others flagged down a
college student and asked her to drive them to the hospital. Id. at 844. Rather than
leave the car when they arrived, defendant pointed a gun at the victim and told her
to keep driving. Id. at 844–45. After defendant took the victim’s $21 and made a
series of stops, the group finally stopped at a rest station where the victim escaped.
Id. at 845. In response to defendant’s Eighth Amendment sentencing challenge, the
court offered a one-paragraph analysis, unaccompanied by legal citation or
consideration of defendant’s age, wherein it reasoned that “[t]his was a heinous
crime and we do not feel that life imprisonment is a cruel and unusual punishment
under the proven facts of this case.” Id. at 847.
254 See Forrester, 587 P.2d at 189 n.10 (reasoning, in part, that “defendant’s 18th
birthday was only about 2 months away when he committed the murders”).
255 Commonwealth v. Sourbeer, 422 A.2d 116, 123–24 (Pa. 1980). The Sourbeer
court, however, did not discuss the role of defendant’s age when affirming his
sentence. Id.; see People v. Rodriguez, 480 N.E.2d 1147, 1156–57 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) (affirming life without parole sentence imposed on a minor of an unspecified
age); Commonwealth v. Diatchenko, 443 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Mass. 1982) (affirming
minor’s life without parole sentence and upholding constitutionality of sentencing
statute that did not allow for consideration of minor’s age as a mitigating factor at
sentencing).
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256

convicted of rape, the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded
that the Nevada and Federal Constitutions prohibited life
sentences for juveniles who commit crimes under the age of
257
sixteen.
In Naovarath v. State, the court considered the
constitutionality of sentencing a delusional thirteen-year-old
seventh grader convicted of an unspecified degree of murder to
258
life in prison without the possibility of parole. At the outset of
its analysis, the court observed, “it is necessary to look at both
the age of the convict and at his probable mental state at the
259
time of the offense.”
After again noting defendant’s age and
that he was psychotic, delusional, and unable to distinguish
reality from fantasy, the court provided the following analysis:
Children are and should be judged by different standards from
those imposed upon mature adults. To say that a thirteenyear-old deserves a fifty or sixty year long sentence,
imprisonment until he dies, is a grave judgment indeed if not
Draconian. To make the judgment that a thirteen-year-old
must be punished with this severity and that he can never be
reformed, is the kind of judgment that, if it can be made at all,
must be made rarely and only on the surest and soundest of
grounds. Looking at the case before us from this perspective,
we conclude that the sentence of life imprisonment without
possibility of parole imposed upon [defendant] was cruel and
unusual under
the Nevada Constitution and the United States
260
Constitution.

256 State v. Foley, 456 So. 2d 979, 984 (La. 1984). In Foley, fifteen-year-old
defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of aggravated rape and sentenced to
life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole. Id. at 980. In rejecting
defendant’s contention on appeal that his sentence was “cruel and unusual,” a
divided Louisiana Supreme Court held that “[t]he mandatory life sentence for
aggravated rape is a valid exercise of the state legislature’s prerogative to determine
the length of sentence for crimes classified as felonies.” Id. at 981 (citations
omitted). But cf. id. at 989 (Calogero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
A little more than a decade later, the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that a life
sentence without possibility of parole for a fifteen-year-old murderer was not
unconstitutional pursuant to the Eighth Amendment. State v. Pilcher, 655 So. 2d
636, 644 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 662 So. 2d 466 (La. 1995); see State v. Wilson,
938 So. 2d 1111, 1147 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding life sentence for seventeenyear-old murderer).
257 Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 947 (1989).
258 Id. at 945.
259 Id. at 946.
260 Id. at 946–47.
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Accordingly, the court ordered the sentencing court to impose a
261
sentence of life with the possibility of parole.
The 1990s, however, ushered in the judiciary’s new “get
tough” approach to juvenile sentencing.
Indeed, an
overwhelming number of states affirmed life without parole
sentences imposed upon juvenile felony defendants at a variety
of ages notwithstanding constitutional objections, including: (1)
a seventeen-year-old convicted of extreme indifference
262
murder,
(2) a sixteen-year-old defendant who committed
263
aggravated murder and assault, (3) a fifteen-year-old who
264
committed second-degree murder, (4) a fourteen-year-old who
was an active participant in two aggravated kidnappings and an
265
aggravated arson, and (5) a thirteen-year-old convicted of a
261

Id. at 949.
People v. Fernandez, 883 P.2d 491, 495 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
263 State v. Garcia, 561 N.W.2d 599, 609–11 (N.D. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 874
(1997); see generally Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding
life without parole sentence for an illiterate and mildly retarded sixteen-year-old
convicted of first-degree murder); Foster v. Withrow, 159 F. Supp. 2d 629, 646 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (affirming life without parole sentence for defendant who was sixteen
at the time he committed first-degree premeditated murder, armed robbery, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony), aff’d, 42 F. App’x 701
(6th Cir. 2002); Brennan v. State, 754 So. 2d 1, 11 (Fla. 1999) (vacating death
penalty imposed on sixteen-year-old defendant convicted of murder and reducing
sentence to life imprisonment without a possibility of parole); Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 538, 554–55 (Va. 1998) (affirming death penalty
sentence imposed upon sixteen-year-old following his commission of capital murder
during a carjacking).
264 State v. Broadhead, 814 P.2d 401, 411 (Idaho 1991), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Brown, 825 P.2d 482 (Idaho 1992); see State v. Shanahan, 994 P.2d
1059, 1061 n.1, 1062–63 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (holding that fifteen-year-old
defendant’s life sentence for murder was not cruel and unusual); State v. Mitchell,
577 N.W.2d 481, 488–91 (Minn. 1998) (holding that mandatory life imprisonment
for fifteen-year-old convicted of first-degree murder is not cruel and unusual
punishment); State v. Stinnett, 497 S.E.2d 696, 701–02 (N.C. 1998) (holding life
without parole sentence given to fifteen-year-old for first-degree murder and assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill does not violate the federal or statute
constitutions); see also Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 566–68 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that it was not cruel and unusual to sentence defendant, who was fifteen
years old when he committed two murders, to life in prison without parole).
265 State v. Walker, 843 P.2d 203, 213 (Kan. 1992); see State v. Jensen, 579 N.W.2d
613, 623–25 (S.D. 1998) (holding that life imprisonment without possibility of parole
for fourteen-year-old convicted of murder is not cruel and unusual); State v. Avery,
509 S.E.2d 476, 481 (S.C. 1998) (upholding sentencing of fourteen-year-old
convicted of murder, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon while committing
a violent crime to concurrent prison sentences of life, twenty-five years, and five
years).
262
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266

first-degree sexual offense.
Thus, the time when the judiciary
questioned the propriety of sentencing a juvenile to life without
parole has long passed, and now a juvenile as young as thirteen
may–depending on the state–be sentenced to life without
267
parole.
266 State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 827–34 (N.C. 1998); see State v. Massey, 803
P.2d 340, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (declining to create a distinction between a
thirteen-year-old juvenile and an adult who are sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole for first degree aggravated murder), cert. denied, Massey v.
Washington, 499 U.S. 960 (1991). Compare Matthew Thomas Wagman, Note,
Innocence Lost: In the Wake of Green, the Trend is Clear–If You Are Old Enough
to Do the Crime, Then You Are Old Enough to Do the Time, 49 CATH. U. L. REV.
643, 675 (2000) (criticizing the Green decision and emphasizing that the North
Carolina Constitution provides more protections to its citizens than does the
Federal Constitution), with Paul G. Morrissey, Note, Do the Adult Crime, Do the
Adult Time: Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Implications for a 13-Year-Old Sex
Offender Sentenced to Life Imprisonment in State v. Green, 44 VILL. L. REV. 707,
739 (1999) (“Based on the staggering statistics and both the local and national
reaction to increased juvenile violence, the North Carolina Supreme Court was
justified in holding that transferring a thirteen-year-old sex offender and sentencing
him to life imprisonment comported with society’s standards of decency.”).
267 The legislature’s attitude corresponds with the judiciary’s attitude; the great
majority of jurisdictions permit life without parole sentences for offenders over the
age of sixteen. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 22(1); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §
13-703(A) (LexisNexis 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(c)(2) (2007); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 17-10-31.1, 15-11-28(b)(2)(A)(i) (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
532.030(1), 640.030(1) (LexisNexis 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1251
(2007); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(b)(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2008); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 72B (LexisNexis 2008); ch. 265, § 2 (LexisNexis 2008); MICH.
COMP. LAWS §§ 769.1(1)(g), 769.9 (2007); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-151(1)(a), 973-21 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 62B.390, 200.030(4)(b)(1) (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:4A-26, 2C:11-3g (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2152.12 (2007),
2929.03(E)(1) (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7301-1.3(4), tit. 21, § 701.9(A) (2008);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(e) (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-23-2, 14-1-7 (2007);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-7605(5), 16-3-20(A) (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1134(a)(1), 39-13-202(c)(2) (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-206(1), 78-3a-603
(2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303, tit. 33, § 5506 (2007).
Some jurisdictions make life without parole sentences mandatory upon
conviction for murder in adult court. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-104(b), 9-27318(b)(2) (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-127, 53a-35a (2008); FLA. STAT. §§
775.082, 985.225 (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 571-22(b), 706-656 (2007); IOWA
CODE § 902.1 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(B) (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 260B.125, 609.106 (2007); MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020(2) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 169-B:24, 630:1-a(III) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2007); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 54.02(a) (Vernon 2007); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31 (Vernon
2007); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.95.030, 13.40.110 (2008).
Only a finite number of jurisdictions impose statutory limits on juvenile
punishment. D.C. CODE § 22-2104(a) (2008) (no life without parole for crimes
committed under age eighteen); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-3(b)(2) (2008) (no life
without parole for crimes committed under age sixteen); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.620

GALLINI.FMT

76

12/8/2008 11:01:36 AM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87, 29

III
THE CONTINUED NEED FOR INDIVIDUALIZED SENTENCES
Collectively, Parts I and II illustrate the potential for disparate
results induced by determinate life without parole sentences.
Putting aside the question of whether such a sentence is morally
correct, automatically sentencing juvenile nonkillers to life in
prison without parole serves only to eviscerate the nowseemingly outdated and idealistic notion of individualized
sentencing. The lack of judicial unanimity on the question of
whether a sentencing court should consider, inter alia, a juvenile
murder accomplice’s age, mental/emotional stability, and the
nature and circumstances of the crime further exacerbates the
problem. Finally, life without parole for less culpable juvenile
murder accomplices erodes whatever is left of the rehabilitation
ideal underlying juvenile punishment.
Equally problematic, the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence does not resolve a juvenile
nonkiller’s constitutional challenge to a life without parole
sentence imposed following a felony murder or accomplice-tomurder conviction. Current Eighth Amendment standards do
not provide sentencing courts with the analytical tools necessary
to account for the stark differences in the fact scenarios
presented by, for example, the crimes giving rise to the decisions
discussed in Part I, namely Petty, Kaiser, Swinford, Miller,
Jensen, and Salinas.
Therefore, the Eighth Amendment
evidently allows a court to treat each of those defendants
identically.
A. What’s the Problem?
“The likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind
of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility
268
of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.”
Although stated in the context of capital punishment, this
(2007) (no life imprisonment for juveniles waived from juvenile court); cf. 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805 (LexisNexis 2007); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1
(a)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2007) (sentence of twenty to sixty years following conviction
for first-degree murder). Notably, several jurisdictions do not have life without
parole sentences. See IDAHO CODE § 18-4004 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4633,
21-4638 (2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10 (West 2008).
268 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988).
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observation by the Thompson Court applies with equal force to
the punishment of life without parole. Yet, mandatory life
without parole sentences for juvenile nonkillers divests from the
sentencing court any modicum of sentencing discretion, which
correspondingly prevents the court from considering the totality
of offender and crime circumstances. Although the federal
sentencing guidelines require judges to consider, inter alia, “the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
269
characteristics of the defendant,”
no uniformly similar
mandate exists at the state level. Indeed, disparate state
decisions fail even to clarify the extent to which age is a relevant
270
consideration at sentencing.
Moreover, the determinate sentencing of juvenile accomplice
nonkillers is inconsistent with what is left of the “rehabilitationbased” approach to juvenile criminal justice. Although the
fundamental goal of the juvenile justice system was–and
271
ostensibly still is–to rehabilitate the juvenile, the dynamic
shift in response to juvenile crime has replaced the idealistic
rehabilitative approach with lengthy determinate sentences.
This movement has prompted courts to approve of the harsh
juvenile penalties discussed in Part II.C and spurred various
legislatures to lower the age at which minors can be waived into

269

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2006).
Compare, e.g., Davis v. State, 718 So.2d 1148, 1166 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995)
(upholding death sentence for twenty-three-year-old defendant, but considering
defendant’s age as a mitigating factor); People v. Eshelman, 275 Cal. Rptr. 810, 816
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (considering defendant’s age in determining whether a
sentence of seventeen years’ imprisonment for the crime of second-degree murder
constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Bryant v. State, 824 A.2d 60, 87 (Md.
2003) (vacating death sentence and holding that “a defendant who has not attained
the age of nineteen as of the date of the crime(s) is entitled to have the youthful age
mitigator considered, albeit the weight given it may be attenuated, depending on
the presence of non-chronological factors”), with State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481,
492 (Minn. 1998) (“[I]t does not violate substantive due process that a court may
not consider age as a mitigating factor when sentencing a child who has been
certified as an adult and subsequently convicted of first-degree murder.”); State v.
Massey, 803 P.2d 340, 348 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that the proportionality
test “does not embody an element or consideration of the defendant’s age, only a
balance between the crime and the sentence imposed”). See Benjamin L. Felcher,
Kids Get the Darndest Sentences: State v. Mitchell and Why Age Should Be a Factor
in Sentencing for First Degree Murder, 18 LAW & INEQ. 323, 348 (2000) (noting that
“the moment of certification to adult court determined Mitchell’s sentence”).
271 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
270
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272

adult court.
The less restrictive waiver provisions and the
trend of punishing more minors like adults for a growing number
of crimes, reflect a philosophical shift in juvenile punishment
273
ideology from rehabilitative to punitive.
This shift in response to juvenile crime has, as outlined
throughout this Article, in some cases inappropriately exposed
less culpable juvenile nonkillers to mandatory life without parole
sentences. Although some jurisdictions have responded by
274
reforming their approach to juvenile punishment, the awkward
juxtaposition between determinate sentencing schemes and the
eviscerated idealistic goals of the juvenile court hardly provides
275
a clear recipe for uniformity.
B. The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
Provides No Answers
A juvenile petitioner convicted of murder pursuant to
accomplice liability, coconspirator liability, or the felony-murder
rule, could likely challenge the constitutionality of a life without
parole sentence in one of two ways. First, petitioner could
undertake the “heavy burden” of asserting that the punishment

272 See Hofacket, supra, note 243, at 163–64. Most notably, between 1990 and
1996, forty legislatures passed laws designed to make it easier to prosecute juveniles
as adults. David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme Youth of
the Accused”: The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 641, 642 (2002) (arguing that change in legislative landscape
produced “less individualized justice and more decisions based solely on the nature
of the charged offense”).
273 See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 72–90
(1997).
Given the decreasing effectiveness of the juvenile court, some
commentators have argued to abolish the court altogether. Id. at 69 (“[S]tates
should abolish juvenile courts’ delinquency jurisdiction and formally recognize
youthfulness as a mitigating factor in the sentencing of younger criminal
offenders.”).
274 See infra note 332 and accompanying text; see also Patricia Torbet & Linda
Szymanskiat, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO VIOLENT
JUVENILE CRIME: 1996–97 UPDATE 7 (1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles/172835.pdf (outlining Texas’s revision to juvenile punishment by
implementing blended sentencing).
275 Cf. Jennifer A. Chin, Note & Comment, Baby-Face Killers: A Cry for Uniform
Treatment for Youths Who Murder, From Trial to Sentencing, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 287,
318 (1999) (“To eliminate the disparate treatment from state to state of juvenile
delinquents for similar criminal offenses, society requires uniformity in the law by
employing the same juvenile procedures nationwide.”).
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is contrary to society’s evolving standards of decency.
Alternatively, petitioner could argue that the sentence is
disproportionate to the crime. Neither the Trop analysis nor the
proportionality test, however, provides the analytical tools
necessary to resolve either challenge. Simply stated, the
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is
unworkable in this context.
1. “Evolving standards of decency”
To evaluate a juvenile accomplice’s evolving standards of
decency challenge pursuant to Trop, a reviewing court must
assimilate some combination of the following factors: (1)
whether a nationwide consensus favors the challenged
276
punishment, (2) the extent to which the behavior of juries and
277
prosecutors invoke the challenged punishment, (3) its own
judgment by focusing on whether the challenged punishment
278
furthers legitimate penological goals, and (4) the climate of
279
international law.
Although “[t]he beginning point is a review of objective
indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the
280
enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question,”
two questions immediately spring to mind: first, how should
courts define the ambiguous term “consensus;” and second, what
evidence is sufficient to demonstrate the requisite consensus?
As to the first question, the following examples clarify that an
inordinate number of ways exist to define a “national
consensus.” For instance, assigning a narrow definition to the
term “national consensus” may reveal a lack of applicable
sources and, thus, an inability to find the requisite consensus in
favor of the challenged punishment. Indeed, if a court construed
the inquiry strictly by focusing specifically on whether juvenile
murder accomplices should always receive sentences of life
276 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005); Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822 n.7 (1988).
277 See, e.g., Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822 n.7; Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976).
278 Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823 n.8 (citing Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
279 Roper, 543 U.S. at 576–78; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830; see Coker, 433 U.S. at
596 n.10 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958)).
280 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
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without parole, it would likely find no applicable state legislative
enactments.
Consider, however, the possible result obtained by expanding
the inquiry to whether the more recent enactments of state
legislatures reveal a growing disapproval of the felony-murder
rule. A brief overview of the felony-murder rule’s origins
281
reflects its early popularity.
Indeed, the first real felonymurder statute was enacted in 1827 when Illinois defined murder
282
to include a “felony exception” by which a death occurring
281 The true origins of the felony-murder rule are difficult to trace. In 1235,
Henry de Bracton assessed the culpability of a person who unintentionally killed
another by distinguishing between whether the death occurred during a lawful or
unlawful act. Binder, supra note 16, at 74. In contrast, Edward Coke in 1628
articulated a much harsher rule by defining murder broadly to include unintentional
deaths resulting from intentional unlawful acts. Id. at 81. Cases applying these
felony-murder principles, however, were few and indeed did not appear until the
end of the nineteenth century, e.g., R. v. Horsey, 176 Eng. Rep. 129, 130–31 (Kent
Assizes 1862); R. v. Serné, 16 Cox’s Crim. L. Cas. 311 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1887), well
after the time English law would have influenced American law, see Birdsong, supra
note 16, at 18. But see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 816–17 (1982) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (asserting that “the common-law [felony-murder] rule was
transplanted to the American Colonies”). Perhaps not surprisingly, then, at least
two commentators assert that the American felony-murder rule developed
independently from England’s. Birdsong, supra note 16, at 17; Binder, supra note
16, at 108.
282 Binder, supra note 16, at 162 n.530. Perhaps the truest precursor to the
Illinois statute is the Pennsylvania Reform Act of 1794, which divided murder into
degrees and provided that murder “committed in the perpetration of or attempt to
perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery or burglary” constituted murder in the first
degree. Edwin R. Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of
Murder, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 771–72 (1949); see JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 658 (Little, Brown and Co. 1858).
Although the Reform Act was actually a “felony aggravator statute,” Pennsylvania
courts nevertheless construed the Reform Act to have the effect of a true felonymurder rule. See Binder, supra note 16, at 145; see also Commonwealth v.
Flanagan, 7 Watts & Serg. 415, 418 (Pa. 1844) (affirming a first-degree murder
conviction after approving the jury instruction: “[I]f the homicide took place in the
commission or attempt to perpetrate [arson, rape, robbery, or burglary], it is . . .
murder in the first degree.”); Commonwealth v. Epps, 44 A. 570, 571 (Pa. 1899)
(calling the question of whether the defendant intended to kill a robbery victim
“wholly immaterial” because the death occurred during the defendant’s attempted
commission of the robbery); Brown v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 319, 330–31 (Pa.
1874) (recognizing that murder requires “malice aforethought, either express or
implied” but reasoning that in the absence of deliberateness or premeditation, “the
perpetration of or the attempt to perpetrate . . . arson, rape, robbery, or burglary”
would render the party “guilty of murder in the first degree, for he would come
within the very words of the statute”). As a “felony aggravator statute,” the
Reform Act could raise the degree of murder if it occurred during an enumerated
offense. Binder, supra note 16, at 144–46; see People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 323
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during an “unlawful act” would be “deemed and adjudged to be
283
Other jurisdictions soon followed by enacting their
murder.”
own felony-murder statutes. In 1829, New Jersey enacted a
statute imposing murder liability for both enumerated felonies
and “any unlawful act against the peace of this state, of which
284
the probable consequence may be bloodshed.”
That same
year, New York defined murder to include killings “without any
design to effect death, by a person engaged in the commission of
285
any felony”
and later expanded the definition to include
286
deaths occurring during any felony.
Texas then amended its
penal code to allow for murder convictions based either on
deaths occurring during an enumerated felony, or a theory of
287
“transferred intent.”
Since these early enactments, however, a number of U.S.
jurisdictions have limited the effect of the felony-murder
(Mich. 1980) (noting that a statute of similar language only aggravates the degree of
murder and does not provide the malice for elevating manslaughter to murder).
283 Binder, supra note 16, at 121 (quoting ILL. REV. CODE. CRIM. CODE § 22
(1827)). The Illinois Supreme Court, however, did not have a chance to interpret
this “felony exception” until 1883 when, in Mayes v. People, it interpreted the
statute’s language to mean that the defendant’s intent was “utterly immaterial.”
106 Ill. 306, 313 (1883). But cf. Brennan v. People, 15 Ill. 511, 517 (1854) (imposing
liability on a defendant who encouraged or aided and abetted an unlawful act
resulting in death, regardless of whether he intended for the death to occur).
According to the court, “manifest[ing] a reckless, murderous disposition” and
“act[ing] solely from general malicious recklessness, disregarding any and all
consequences” was sufficient to support a murder conviction. Mayes, 106 Ill. at 313.
284 Binder, supra note 16, at 121 (citing Act of Feb. 17, 1829, § 66, 1828-1829 N.J.
Acts 109, 128). In State v. Cooper, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified that a
killing would amount to murder if committed during the course of felony
“especially if death were a probable consequence of the [felony].” 13 N.J.L. 361, 1
(1833).
285 Binder, supra note 16, at 121 (citing N.Y. REV. STAT. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 1, § 5
(1829)).
286 Id. at 173 (citing Act of May 29, 1873, ch. 644, 1873 N.Y. Laws 1014). Early
decisions seemed to limit the applicability of the felony-murder doctrine to
accomplices. See People v. Van Steenburgh, 1 Parker’s Crim. Rep. 39 (N.Y. Ct.
Oyer & Terminer 1845). During a riot where an officer was shot and killed, fifty
men were convicted of various crimes yet only two were ultimately convicted for
the killing. Id.
287 Binder, supra note 16, at 168; Rodriguez v. State, 953 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997); see, e.g., McCoy v. State, 25 Tex. 33 (1860) (providing example of
“transferred intent” doctrine in the context of felony murder); Richards v. State, 30
S.W. 805, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 1895). Notably, Texas was the “felony murder
center of America during the nineteenth century, with about one-fourth of all the
reported felony murder convictions in the country.” Binder, supra note 16, at 167.

GALLINI.FMT

82

12/8/2008 11:01:36 AM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87, 29

doctrine. Pennsylvania, for instance, has reduced the degree and
corresponding punishment for felony murder to murder in the
288
Other jurisdictions require a mens rea beyond
second degree.
the mere intent to commit the underlying felony to sustain a
289
murder conviction.
Still other jurisdictions allow less-culpable
accomplices to raise an affirmative defense to a felony-murder
290
charge.
Perhaps more significantly, at least four jurisdictions have
291
abolished the felony-murder rule.
In the course of formally
abolishing its felony-murder statute, the Hawaii legislature noted
that even a “limited formulation [of] the felony-murder rule is
292
still objectionable.”
Similarly, Kentucky’s legislature
abandoned felony murder in favor of an “intentional” and
293
“wantonness with extreme indifference” standard. In contrast,
Ohio statutory law now states that “[n]o person shall cause the
death of another . . . as a proximate result of the offender’s
294
committing or attempting to commit a felony.”
Finally,
Michigan abandoned its felony-murder rule by judicial decision
295
in 1980.
The collective movement by state legislatures away
from original formulations of the felony-murder rule suggests its
growing disfavor and may therefore justify a court’s decision to
hold that the evolving standards of decency preclude the
imposition of a life without parole sentence on a less-culpable
juvenile nonkiller convicted of felony murder.
288 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (West 2008); accord ALASKA STAT. §
11.41.110 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5203 (West 2007).
289 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636(2) (2007) (requiring a defendant to
recklessly cause a death while committing or attempting to commit any felony to
sustain a first-degree murder conviction).
290 E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 2008) (providing an affirmative
defense if the defendant did not (1) commit or solicit the killing, (2) carry a deadly
weapon, (3) reasonably believe his accomplices were armed with deadly weapons,
and (4) reasonably believe his accomplices intended for the death or injury to
occur).
291 See, e.g., People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 325–26 (1980).
292 See id. at 314 (citations omitted).
293 Meredith v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Ky. 2005) (explaining that
a defendant’s culpability “must now be measured by the degree of wantonness or
recklessness reflected by the extent of his participation in the underlying robbery”
(citation omitted)), discussing KY. REV. STAT. § 507.020 (West 2007).
294 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04 (West 2007).
295 Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 325–26.
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Alternatively, a court need only tweak the inquiry to approve
the punishment by focusing on (1) the offender’s age and the
proposed punishment, without also considering the offender’s
296
role; or (2) whether the crime committed by the juvenile
297
would be murder if committed by an adult.
The second question–what evidence is sufficient to
demonstrate a national consensus–also presents something of a
moving target. Although the Supreme Court has expressed a
preference for relying on the enactments of state legislatures, it
has not indicated that state statutes comprise the only acceptable
298
evidence of a “national consensus.”
The Supreme Court’s
imprecise instructions for how to demonstrate a national
consensus arguably extends to reviewing courts an invitation to

296 Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1996). In Harris, fifteen-year-old
Michael Harris and thirteen-year-old Barry Massey entered Paul Wang’s store
where Massey shot and stabbed Wang to death, after which the two emptied the
cash register, took assorted merchandise, and left. Id. at 582. Following his
conviction and sentence of life in prison without parole, Harris appealed and
asserted that his sentence was cruel and unusual because he was a fifteen-year-old
first-time offender and his codefendant killed the victim. Id. at 582–83. Viewing
the “national consensus” prong broadly, the Ninth Circuit asked whether there
existed “a strong legislative consensus against imposing mandatory life without
parole on offenders who commit their crimes before the age of sixteen.” Id. at 583.
This broad view allowed the court to conclude that Harris could not meet his
“heavy burden” to demonstrate that the evolving standards of decency precluded
his sentence because at least twenty-one states allowed for the imposition of
mandatory life without parole on fifteen-year-olds. Id. at 583–84.
Moreover, according to the court, Harris’s sentence was not disproportionate to
his crime. Id. at 585 (“[W]hile capital punishment is unique and must be treated
specially, mandatory life imprisonment without parole is, for young and old alike,
only an outlying point on the continuum of prison sentences.”). Yet, one
commentator criticized the Harris decision for failing “to address adequately the
unique station of juvenile defendants within the proportionality formula.” Recent
Case, Eighth Amendment–Juvenile Sentencing–Ninth Circuit Upholds Life
Sentence Without Possibility of Parole of Fifteen-Year-Old Murderer, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1185, 1185 (1997); see Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment:
Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 681, 691–93
(1998) (criticizing the Harris decision and arguing that “age must play a distinct and
central role in the proportionality analysis of juvenile [life without parole]
sentences”); Hofacket, supra note 243, at 180–81 (criticizing the Harris court’s
failure “to address the Supreme Court’s assurance that ‘individualized
consideration’ of a juvenile’s maturity is performed when trying and sentencing
minors”).
297 E.g., Thomas v. State, 562 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
298 As noted, the Court has also relied on the judgment of juries. Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833
(1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794–96 (1982).

GALLINI.FMT

84

12/8/2008 11:01:36 AM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87, 29

expand their analysis by relying on more attenuated sources like
the decisions of state courts. Yet, relying on the decisions of
state courts to establish a national consensus leaves unresolved
the question of what impact another state court’s decision should
have if rendered on the basis of that state’s constitution.
Alternatively, nothing definitively prevents a court from
turning to congressional findings for objective indicia of
consensus. Consider, then, the congressional findings published
in connection with the codification of the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act (“Juvenile Act”) where Congress
observed that “[a]lthough the juvenile violent crime arrest rate
in 1999 was the lowest in the decade, there remains a consensus
that the number of crimes and the rate of offending by juveniles
299
nationwide is still too high.”
Moreover, the Juvenile Act lists
an array of figures demonstrating how current methods of
300
juvenile crime prevention and punishment are failing.
The
Juvenile Act then cryptically suggests that, to address the
problem of juvenile crime, juvenile punishments should include
“methods for increasing victim satisfaction with respect to the
301
penalties imposed on juveniles for their acts.”
These
illustrative examples serve only to amplify the point that a court
can manipulate the consensus inquiry by simply changing the
search parameters. Indeed, any of these examples provide an
adequate definition for, and evidence of, a national consensus.
Defining national consensus in this manner, however, hardly
reveals the nationwide sentiment toward sentencing lessculpable juvenile nonkillers to life in prison without parole.
Instead, this analytical framework allows the cooperative
relationship between automatic transfer statutes and
determinate sentencing statutes to persist. As the Miller court
observed, those statutes may require a sentencing court to treat
juvenile nonkillers in the same manner it would treat an
302
accomplished adult serial killer.
This same statutory
relationship does not reflect that a majority of state legislatures
would affirm the practice of sentencing all juvenile accomplice

299

42 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
See 42 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(6) (reporting that the number of cities reporting gang
problems has increased 843%).
301 42 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(10)(B).
302 See People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 308 (Ill. 2002).
300

GALLINI.FMT

2008]

12/8/2008 11:01:36 AM

Equal Sentences for Unequal Participation

85

nonkillers to life in prison, particularly those convicted of felony
303
Given the ease with which courts can manipulate–
murder.
even perhaps unintentionally–the meaning of “national
consensus,” this aspect of the Trop analysis cannot resolve more
focused punishment questions.
Second, without additional Supreme Court guidance, the
manner in which one inquires into the “behavior” of juries and
prosecutors seems open to interpretation. To aid in the
resolution of this inquiry, the Thompson Court relied on
Department of Justice statistics, noting that such statistics help
304
identify trends in societal views.
The Department of Justice
does not maintain statistics on the number of juvenile nonkillers
convicted
of
felony
murder,
or
murder
as
305
accomplices/coconspirators, and serving life sentences.
Although the Office of Justice Programs (within the Department
of Justice) keeps extremely detailed statistics on an inordinate
306
number of trends in juvenile crime,
none approaches the
specificity needed to examine juries’ and prosecutors’
approaches to sentencing juvenile nonkillers convicted of
murder. Thus, in this context, any inquiry into the behavior of
juries and prosecutors appears futile.
Third, this Article can only speculate as to how a reviewing
court might exercise its own judgment. By piecing together
anecdotal rationale from Roper and its progeny, it is clear that a
reviewing court should reject the notion that sentencing a
juvenile nonkiller convicted of murder to life without parole
furthers the traditional penological goals of retribution,

303

See People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 727 (Cal. 1983).
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 832–33 (1988).
305 According to the Human Rights Watch, “[e]ach state department of
corrections has its own method for coding the type of crime committed by its
prisoners.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE REST OF
THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED
STATES 26 n.46 (2005), http://hrw.org/en/reports/2005/10/11/rest-their-lives-0.
Additionally, “in many states the category of ‘first degree murder’ or ‘murder’
includes both intentional homicide and the felony crime described in the text as
‘felony murder.’” Id. As a result, it becomes “difficult to determine which types or
sub-categories of youth crimes tended to result in a life without parole sentence.”
Id.
306 HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT, http://ojjdp.ncjrs
.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf.
304
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deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
Instead, in the
exercise of its own judgment, a reviewing court should likely
reason, as did the Thompson and Roper Courts, that the case for
justifying juvenile sentences by reference to penological goals is
308
not as strong with a minor as with an adult.
Lastly, the climate of international law unambiguously reflects
a worldwide disdain for life without parole sentences imposed
309
a far broader
upon children under the age of eighteen,
proposition than is undertaken by this Article. The Convention
on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) states, in pertinent part, that
“‘[n]either capital punishment nor life imprisonment without
possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by
310
persons below eighteen years of age.’”
Importantly, as of
2005, 192 out of a total of 194 countries were parties to the CRC;
only the United States and Somalia have declined to ratify the
311
CRC (although both have signed it).
The “evolving standards of decency” inquiry is both overly
312
flexible and “tantalizingly vague.” It allows courts to craft and
define their own version of a national consensus, selectively rely
on tangentially related statistics, and exercise their own
judgment to either accept or reject a juvenile nonkiller’s
sentencing challenge. Accordingly, one reviewing court might
sustain a sentencing challenge proffered by Kaiser, Swinford, or
Miller, while another rejects identical challenges from Petty,

307 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 305, at 111–13 (discussing how life
without parole sentences for juveniles fail to meet any of the four goals of
punishment).
308 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005); Thompson, 487 U.S. at
837–38.
309 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 305, at 98 (“Recognizing the
unacceptability of sentences that negate the potential of children to make changes
for the better over time, the [Convention on the Rights of the Child] flatly prohibits
sentencing children to life sentences without parole or to the death penalty.”). But
cf. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576 (discussing Article 37 of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child).
310 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 305, at 98 (quoting CRC, art. 37(a))
(emphasis removed).
311 Id. at 99. “The United States signed the CRC on February 16, 1995, and
Somalia signed on May 2, 2002.” Id. at 99 n.293.
312 Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, But the Center Holds: The Supreme Court
and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1480 (2002).
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313

Jensen, or Salinas.
The potential for such disparate results
suggests that courts should reject the Trop analysis in the unique
context of a sentencing challenge proffered by a juvenile
nonkiller convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison
without parole.
2. Proportionality
Second, a juvenile nonkiller sentenced to life in prison without
the possibility of parole could proffer a disproportionality
314
Any modern court’s response to a proportionality
argument.
challenge must focus on objective criteria and specifically begin
with considering the gravity of the offense and the harshness of
315
the punishment. A reviewing court must likewise consider the
316
severity of the crime alongside the juvenile’s criminal history.
As noted, unless the juvenile’s sentence leads to an inference of
disproportionality, the inquiry ends after a court considers this
317
factor.
Applying this test to hypothetical sentencing challenges from
the six defendants discussed in Part I, supra, reveals that the
Supreme Court’s standards do not provide a sentencing court
with the tools necessary to resolve an Eighth Amendment
challenge at the time of sentencing. Although the Court’s
opinions collectively counsel reviewing courts to examine
specifically a juvenile’s offense and punishment, the
proportionality analysis makes no provision for dealing with the
“statutory bootstrapping” problem confronted by the Miller
313 As discussed earlier, a hypothetical challenge by a defendant like Kaiser
carries the unique context of applying felony murder to less-culpable juvenile
nonkillers. See generally supra Part I and accompanying discussion. Moreover, as a
broad proposition, it seems the felony-murder rule was never intended to apply to
juvenile accomplices. See Drizin & Keegan, supra note 13, at 531; see also Scott
Robinson, Felony Murder Statute Dates to 1535 English Law, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS,
March
29,
2005,
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/news
_columnists/article/0,1299,DRMN_86_3658375,00.html
(criticizing
Colorado’s
felony-murder rule and noting that “[p]arliament abolished the doctrine of felony
murder in 1957, based on the recognition that the rule often had overly harsh
consequences”).
314 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997–98 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
315 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983) (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 597–98 (1977)).
316 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003).
317 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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court (i.e., the convergence of automatic transfer,
accountability/felony-murder,
and
mandatory-punishment
statutes). Thus, short of finding these statutes unconstitutional,
318
as did the trial court in Miller, nothing allows a sentencing
court to independently consider a juvenile’s circumstances at
sentencing. Problems of judicial inefficiency aside, failing to
provide a lower court with the opportunity to render a
subsequent appeal unnecessary by considering offender and
punishment circumstances during sentencing is perhaps the
largest flaw in the disproportionality analysis.
Assuming, arguendo, that a reviewing court has the
opportunity to consider the gravity of the offense and nature of
the punishment, juveniles like Darla Jo Swinford and Leon
Miller may, given their minimal roles in the underlying murders,
319
be entitled to an “inference of disproportionality.”
Although
320
murder is “the most extreme of crimes” neither Swinford nor
Miller had a prior juvenile record and each received the harshest
321
possible sentence, short of death, for their minimal roles in the
underlying crime.
Moreover, compared to the principal
perpetrators, both Swinford and Miller had only a “passive” role
322
in the victims’ deaths.
Ordinarily, Supreme Court jurisprudence next requires a
hypothetical reviewing court considering a sentencing challenge
from a defendant like Miller or Swinford to evaluate: (1) the

318

People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 303–04 (Ill. 2002).
See People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 721 (Cal. 1983); see also Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137, 154 (1987) (focusing on participation level of defendants and noting
that “substantial participation in a violent felony under circumstances likely to
result in the loss of innocent human life may justify the death penalty even absent
an ‘intent to kill’” (emphasis added)). To avoid belaboring the point, this
paragraph and corresponding subsection focus exclusively on Swinford and Miller
solely for illustrative purposes. Of course, similar arguments could be made on
behalf of defendant Kaiser, discussed above in Part I.
320 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality).
321 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1025–26 (1991) (White, J.,
dissenting).
322 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296 (1983). The Solem Court appeared to
define a “passive felony” as one that involves “neither violence nor threat of
violence to any person.” Id. If a reviewing court strictly applied this definition,
then surely Swinford’s and Miller’s mere involvement in the murder would preclude
a court from categorizing their felony as “passive.” Thus, only if a reviewing court
focused on their roles in the felony could they earn the passive designation.
319
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323

sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdictions,
and (2) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime
324
Yet, on the basis of vicarious-liability
in other jurisdictions.
325
statutes, states can punish convicted conspirators, accomplices,
or abettors to a capital murder with, at a minimum, life in
326
prison. Those laws were, however, enacted to address adult–
327
not juvenile–offenders.
Thus, reviewing courts cannot infer
that each state’s legislature has made a specific decision to
sentence the less-culpable juvenile nonkiller accomplice to life in
328
prison without parole.
Doing so arguably enables the
reviewing court to at least partially individualize each juvenile’s
sentence.
A court undertaking this analysis must also consider the
329
additional factors listed by the Solem Court.
Particularly
mindful of Solem’s offering that “[a] court . . . is entitled to look
330
at a defendant’s motive in committing a crime,” reviewing

323

Id. at 291.
Id.
325 Although separate statutes exist governing an accomplice’s criminal liability,
see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-301, 13-303 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
271 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-302 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6 (2008);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 306 (2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02 (Vernon 2007),
being an accomplice is ordinarily not a separately chargeable offense; it is instead a
theory that the state may utilize to establish the commission of a substantive
criminal offense, see, e.g., State v. Woods, 815 P.2d 912, 914 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991);
People v. Verlinde, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322, 331 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
326 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1251 (2008); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
265, § 2 (LexisNexis 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-21 (2008).
327 See generally Christine Chamberlin, Note, Not Kids Anymore: A Need for
Punishment and Deterrence in the Juvenile Justice System, 42 B.C. L. REV. 391, 403
(2001) (“[I]f jurisdiction over a juvenile is transferred to adult court and the juvenile
is found guilty of the offense, the court may impose upon the juvenile the adult
sanction appropriate for the offense.”); Cathi J. Hunt, Note, Juvenile Sentencing:
Effects of Recent Punitive Sentencing Legislation on Juvenile Offenders and a
Proposal for Sentencing in the Juvenile Court, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 621, 633
(1999) (“Transfer represents a decision that the more punitive sentences the adult
criminal justice system offers are necessary for the particular juvenile offender.”).
328 See Concerned Residents of Buck Hill Falls v. Grant, 537 F.2d 29, 35 n.12 (3d
Cir. 1976) (noting Congress did not consider the issue, and thus court was unwilling
to assume Congressional intent); United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, 206 F.3d 1337,
1342 (9th Cir. 2001) (Canby, J., dissenting) (noting that it is error for a court to
assume, without evidence, that Congress actually considered and rejected certain
alternatives).
329 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293–94 (1983) (listing additional factors).
330 Id. at 293.
324
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courts should construe the term “motive” broadly and view this
language as an invitation to investigate any aspects of the
juvenile’s background that led to his or her participation in the
331
crime.
Regardless of how a court ultimately assimilates the maze that
is Solem, Harmelin, Ewing, Lockyer, and others, the problematic
reality is that, even if a less-culpable juvenile nonkiller ultimately
challenges his or her sentence of life without parole following a
murder conviction obtained pursuant to a charge of felony
murder or coconspirator/accomplice liability, the remedy, if any,
comes at the end of a lengthy string of appeals. Given a state
trial court’s inability to consider offender circumstances at the
time of a defendant’s sentencing, both courts and legislatures
should reexamine the propriety of sentencing the less-culpable
juvenile nonkiller to life in prison without parole. Specifically,
state legislatures should revisit the laws governing juvenile
sentences in order to individualize punishments in accordance
332
with the juvenile perpetrator’s participation.
Alternatively, at a minimum, sentencing courts should retain
the discretion to account for the juvenile’s age, criminal and
331 For example, in Swinford, the Mississippi Supreme Court should have viewed
the sentencing court’s decision to sentence Swinford without the benefit of a
presentencing report as unacceptable. See Sucik v. State, 689 A.2d 78, 81 (Md.
1997) (“When a trial court ignores the PSI requirement, it acts counter to the
requirements of the very law that makes possible a sentence of life without
parole.”); see also State v. Maschek, 706 So. 2d 512, 516 (La. Ct. App. 1998)
(remanding for resentencing of defendant and noting “the court’s decision to ignore
the recommendation of the PSI and impose a stricter sentence is disturbing because
it is based upon unsupported evidentiary facts”).
332 Colorado, for example, recently reversed its life without parole statute for
juveniles and now imposes a determinate forty-year sentence on juveniles
prosecuted directly as adults or transferred from juvenile court. COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 18-1.3-401(4)(b)(I), 18-1.3-401(4)(b)(II) (2008) (stating that the revised penalty
provided in “paragraph (b) shall apply to persons sentenced for offenses committed
on or after July 1, 2006”). The change was overdue; Colorado ranked eleventh in
the nation for the rate at which life sentences are imposed on juveniles and applied
felony-murder charges disproportionately to juveniles. Miles Moffeit & Kevin
Simpson, Teen Crime, Adult Time: Laws Converge to Put Teens Away Forever,
DENVER POST, Oct. 26, 2006, http://www.denverpost.com/teencrime/ci_3636564
(“Among [Colorado] juveniles sentenced to life since 1998, 60 percent went to
prison on felony[-]murder convictions, compared with 24 percent of adult cases.”);
see Gwen Florio & Sue Lindsay, Locked up Forever: Debate Builds over the Fate of
46 Teen Killers Sentenced to Life in Prison Without Parole, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Sept. 16, 2005, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/local/article/
0,1299,DRMN_15_4083343,00.html (noting that one of every eight inmates serving
life without parole sentences in Colorado was convicted as a juvenile).
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333

family history, mental health, and role in the crime.
Regardless of the source, be it judicial or legislative, the law
should account for the unique circumstances of juvenile’s role in
the killing at sentencing rather than the end of the appellate
process.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s current Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence is not prepared to resolve the persistent and
perhaps growing problem of sentencing less-culpable juvenile
334
murder accomplices to life without parole.
Although the
Court has expressed a willingness to treat juvenile punishment
differently, it has not had occasion to evaluate the
constitutionality of sentencing less-culpable juvenile nonkillers
to life without parole following their murder convictions
pursuant to felony murder, coconspirator, or accomplice liability.
Until the Court has an opportunity to consider the issue,
sentencing courts will continue to punish juvenile nonkiller
accomplices without considering factors like offender
characteristics, motive, level of participation, or the nature of the
335
crime. Such one-dimensional sentencing is plainly inconsistent

333 In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 931–32 (Cal. 1972) (outlining the “techniques” a
reviewing court must employ when determining whether a punishment violates the
“cruel or unusual” clause of the California Constitution); see People v. Gonzalez,
104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 247, 257–59 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (applying Lynch in the context of
juvenile offenders). Although such techniques remain wrapped up in the appeals
process, the “techniques”–like the Solem Court’s approach–at least seek to
individualize each defendant’s sentence.
334 Tanenhaus & Drizin, supra note 272, at 667 (“[B]ecause prosecutorial waivers
and legislative waivers are more difficult to track, it is currently not known how
many total youths under eighteen years of age are prosecuted as adults each year; at
least one estimate places the number as high as 200,000.”). Accurate statistics are
indeed difficult to come by; some statistics reflecting the increase in juvenile gang
violence suggest that courts may increasingly encounter varied participation levels
from juvenile accomplice nonkillers like the fact patterns presented by the case
studies in this Article. See supra note 303 and accompanying text. Conversely,
other studies suggest that juvenile violence began decreasing in the 1990s. See
Hofacket, supra note 243, at 164–65.
335 See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697–98 (1975) (noting that American
criminal law has long considered a defendant’s intention to be critical to “the
degree of [his] criminal culpability”).
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with the uniformly desirable judicial goal of individualizing each
336
defendant’s punishment.

336 See Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) (“It is necessary to
individualize each case, to give that careful, humane and comprehensive
consideration to the particular situation of each offender which would be possible
only in the exercise of a broad discretion.”).

